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ABSTRACT
The positive theory of litigation predicts that, under certain
conditions, plaintiffs and defendants achieve an unremarkable
and roughly equivalent share of litigation success. This Article,
grounded in an empirical analysis of WTO adjudication from
1995 through 2007, reveals a high disparity between
Complainant and Respondent success rates: Complainants win
roughly ninety percent of the disputes.
This disparity
transcends Case Type, Party Identity, Income Level, and other
litigant-specific characteristics. After analyzing and discarding
standard empirical and theoretical alternative explanations for
the systematic disparity in success rates, this study
demonstrates, through an examination of patterns in WTO
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adjudicators’ notorious decisions, that biased rule development
explains this disparity. This Article then discusses the effect of
biased rule development on perceptions of the WTO dispute
settlement system’s democratic legitimacy and legality. (JEL: K
33, K 41)
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[I]t is the Membership which through its appointments will ex ante
ensure that the quality of Appellate Body reports will be preserved.
Ex post, the civic community discusses the activities of the WTO
adjudicating bodies and through its writings gives or denies its vote of
confidence.1

I. INTRODUCTION
In ordinary litigation, one expects any pattern in judicial
decisions to reflect the balance of the strength of plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ cases. Absent information asymmetries or different
stakes among plaintiffs and defendants, long-term trends in favor of
one type of litigant do not occur. Each party’s preference for (or
aversion to) litigation adjusts to cues emanating from the litigation
environment.2 Indeed, the prevailing positive theory of judicial
adjudication explains that it is unlikely for a particular type of
litigant to systematically prevail over time because stronger cases
will settle rather than result in full adjudication.3 With the mortality
of such strong cases thus accounted for, litigation assumes an
unpredictable nature, where decisions favoring plaintiffs are just as
likely as those favoring defendants.4 As no particular trends emerge
under these circumstances, litigation becomes the realm of
randomness. However, where trends in judicial decisions favoring a
particular type of litigant emerge, and the above assumptions hold,
such trends might be viewed as the product of transformational shifts
in the law. If an investigation into the nature of the law being made
in the adjudicatory process indicates that this process increasingly
benefits one particular type of litigant, one must consider whether the
discrepancy in success rates is the result of biased rule development,
or even the product of conscious judicial effort.5

1.
Petros Mavroidis & Thomas Cottier, The Role of the Judge in International
Trade Regulation: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO 1, 2 (Thomas Cottier & Petros
Mavroidis eds., 2003).
2.
See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of
Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1071–73 (1989).
3.
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (1984).
4.
Id. at 17–20.
5.
See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., The Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 503
(1990) (discussing trends in decision making); Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation,
and Common Law Evolution, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 33, 35 (2006) (discussing unbiased
rule evolution).
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Do the insights applicable to ordinary litigation extend to the
domain of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute system? The
creation of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) represented a
major shift in the legal conception of trade disputes.6 The political,
consensus-based system of dispute settlement, prevalent during the
“GATT years,” gave way to a rule-based, litigation-driven architecture
designed to strengthen the multilateral trading system by providing
both final and legally enforceable decisions.7 While the DSB retained
GATT’s sovereign-nation-centered arrangement, the shift in legal
philosophy has brought it closer to the characteristics of ordinary
systems of litigation. For instance, principles such as finality, basic
due process, and adherence to established rules on legislative and
“judicial” jurisdiction form the bedrock of both the DSB and other
court-based systems.8 This similarity in fundamental characteristics
to ordinary litigation allows the application of the existing theory to
the class of disputes thus far presented to the DSB. As this system
has been in place for more than a decade, having decided disputes
affecting more than thirty-three of its member countries in over one
hundred cases, there is now sufficient data to determine if the
standard model’s theoretical expectations can also be verified in the
outcomes of these disputes.9
Of course, any attempt to extend the standard model of litigation
to DSB disputes must account for specific constraints unique to WTO
litigants. First, because sovereigns must respond to competing
domestic political concerns, they may not be subject to the same
incentives or pressures as litigants in domestic adjudication.
However,
WTO
members,
like
corporations
and
other
multidimensional litigants, can and do aggregate preferences and are
able to express their balanced or consensus-driven choices in a unified
manner. That the WTO’s basic rules and the operation of the
international system impose constraints on members’ ability to settle
disputes has been suggested as an important distinction between

6.
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 264 (4th ed. 2002).
7.
See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193
(1996) (describing the results of the Uruguay Round). Compare General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]
(demonstrating the consensus-based GATT system), with Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 2(4), Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
8.
See generally JACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 246–64 (examining the
transition from the GATT dispute settlement system to the DSB).
9.
See WTO Dispute Settlement—Chronological List of Dispute Cases,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2009) (listing the disputes brought before the DSB and the countries involved).
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WTO dispute settlement and ordinary litigation.10 Specifically,
Guzman and Simmons theorize that the coexistence of parallel
international commitments and the unavailability of certain typical
settlement options deriving from the operation of the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) principle depress settlement activity in WTO
litigation.11 While a definite feature of WTO litigation, settlement
constraints do not seem to have a significant impact on members’
litigation behavior, as will be demonstrated later in the study.
After conducting a thorough examination of all disputes
submitted to the DSB, this Article shows that WTO litigation does
not conform to the ordinary model’s prediction that no trends will
develop in favor of a particular party.12 In fact, a sustained pattern of
Complainant success across all categories of disputes (e.g., trade
remedy and non-trade remedy), regardless of Complainant-specific
characteristics (e.g., country identity, and level of income) or producttype (e.g., commodities and noncommodities), indicates that WTO
litigation results are far from symmetric. This Article then attempts
to explain why there is a consistently high rate of Complainant
success in WTO dispute resolution. Arguably, this pro-Complainant
WTO trend might be understood as the result of the violation of the
model’s general assumption of zero settlement-related transaction
costs. However, while the low frequency of settlement activity might
positively impact the rate of Complainant wins, its overall effect is
not strong enough to explain the trend favoring one particular type of
litigant over the other.
This Article proposes that the pro-Complainant tendency
prevailing in all forms of WTO adjudication is likely the result of
biased rule development. Specifically, it theorizes that the DSB has
evolved WTO norms in a manner that consistently favors litigants
whose interests are generally aligned with the unfettered expansion
of trade. While it is quite uncontroversial that an adjudicatory
system engaged in interpreting trade-liberalizing standards would
tend to favor free trade,13 the presence of particular, consistent
patterns in these interpretations raises concerns about the system’s
adherence to the negotiated terms of the agreements, especially with
respect to Respondents’ reserved regulatory competencies. Although
the limited number of fully adjudicated WTO disputes requires some
degree of caution in interpreting empirical results, the combination of

10.
Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An
Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 205
(2002).
11.
Id. at 210–11.
12.
Since only WTO members can be parties to WTO disputes, this Article uses
the terms “party” and “member” interchangeably.
13.
See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 333 (1999).
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sustained, highly asymmetric adjudication outcomes with WTO
adjudicators’ adoption of a pro-Complainant stance in numerous
decisions supports the conclusion that WTO adjudicatory outcomes
are the result of biased rule development.
Part II of this Article briefly outlines the operation of the DSB.
Part III examines prior literature on WTO litigation. Part IV
presents discussions on the data, methods, and empirical results of
all filed and fully adjudicated disputes. Part V discusses whether
various alternative empirical and theoretical explanations could
account for the general pattern of observed results. Among these, the
study addresses the potential impact of case selection and provides an
evaluation of the extent to which the high Complainant success rate
can be explained by the transaction costs associated with settling.
Part VI proposes biased rule development as the explanation for the
discrepancy in Complainant and Respondent success rates through
an examination of decision patterns reflected in a number of cases.
While this Article does not claim to resolve every competing
empirical, theoretical, or normative explanation for DSB results,
analysis of these decisions tends to support prior anecdotal studies
alleging that WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body have
interpreted the WTO agreements in a manner that consistently
promotes the goal of expanding trade, often to the detriment of
Respondents’ negotiated and reserved regulatory competencies.
II. OPERATION OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
To ensure that bargained-for trade concessions (e.g., tariff
reductions, elimination of nontariff barriers, and market access) are
not frustrated by members’ adoption of trade-restrictive measures,
the WTO agreements provide a mechanism of binding dispute
settlement.14 Under the supervision of the DSB, on which each WTO
member sits, panels and the Appellate Body deliberate and make
rulings on disputes submitted by members.15 Specifically, where
either a panel or the Appellate Body finds that a challenged member’s
measure “nullifies or impairs” another member’s “benefits accruing”
under one of the “covered agreements,” the adjudicator prepares a
final report and then submits it to the DSB for formal adoption.16

14.
DSU, supra note 7, arts. 1(1), 7(2), 22(3). By the express language of GATT
1994 Article 1(a), the provisions of GATT remain effective “as rectified, amended or
modified by the terms of the” more recent WTO agreements. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, art. 1(a), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
15.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 2(1).
16.
Id. art. 10(4); see also GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII (discussing the
implications of nullification and impairment).
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Following DSB adoption, the offending country must eliminate the
noncompliant measure and bring its practices into compliance with
the ruling.17 Failure to comply triggers the possibility of suspension
of concessions on the part of the prevailing member.18 However,
suspension of WTO obligations vis-à-vis the offending member is
generally the exception—the mere possibility of countermeasures
provides a substantial incentive for compliance.19
Among the substantive norms used to gauge whether a measure
amounts to a “nullification” of another member’s rights, the most
important are the MFN principle, the national treatment principle,
and the nondiscrimination principle. These norms generally prohibit
discrimination among goods and services imported from or provided
by any member and proscribe any discrepancy in the treatment of
foreign and domestic goods and services.20 For example, under the
MFN principle, any advantage or beneficial treatment extended to
one member in regard to border measures (e.g., tariff rules or customs
practices) must be extended to all other WTO members.21 These
three basic pillars of WTO law, however, extend to areas beyond
border measures, such as internal taxes and regulations pertaining to
internal transportation, distribution, and sale.22 In sum, members
cannot adopt measures that either facially or in effect discriminate
among foreign-origin products or favor domestic products.23 Due to
the importance of these broad principles to trade liberalization,
numerous GATT/WTO agreements effectively mirror these
provisions.24
17.
DSB adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports is largely a formality. To
date, the DSB has adopted every final panel or Appellate Body report. World Trade
Organization, Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body, Appellate Body Reports,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_reports_e.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2009); cf. John Ragosta et al., WTO Dispute Settlement: The System Is Flawed and
Must Be Fixed, 37 INT’L LAW. 697, 744–45 (2003) (discussing the lack of legitimacy and
democratic participation in the DSB).
18.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 22(3); GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII.
19.
See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 257–59.
20.
See GATT, supra note 7, arts. I, III, XIII (discussing the MFN principle, the
national treatment principle, and the nondiscrimination principle).
21.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, art. II, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS]; GATT, supra note 7, art. I.
22.
See GATT, supra note 7, art. III.
23.
GATT, supra note 7, art. III; see GATS, supra note 21, art. IV.
24.
See, e.g., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
art. 3, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter SCM Agreement]
(prohibiting subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods); GATT,
supra note 7, arts. III, V, X, XI (discussing freedom of transit, transparency in the
administration of trade regulations, general prohibition against quantitative
restrictions, and transparency respectively).
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Such broad requirements are also subject to qualified exceptions.
Specifically, members have retained the GATT-based right to apply
offsetting tariffs to “dumped”25 or impermissibly subsidized products
that cause material injury to domestic producers.26 A set of strong
public policy exceptions was also preserved from the GATT years.
Among these exceptions are measures deemed necessary to protect
public morals,27 measures relating to conservation of natural
resources,28 and emergency trade restrictions that safeguard a
member’s balance of payments.29 Historically, these deviations from
free trade were meant to facilitate further rounds of trade
liberalization by giving the contracting governments the public policy
space within which to maneuver through adjustments owing to
decreasing levels of tariffication.30 Members must justify these
departures from the broad principles of free trade, however. These
permissible deviations strike a complex balance between members’
needs to countervail trade-distorting policies and their potential
protectionist relapses.
Building upon these broad GATT principles, the Uruguay Round,
which culminated in the creation of the WTO in 1994, gave birth to
new obligations and reciprocal rights. New multilateral agreements
created additional trade disciplines and international standards in
areas such as sanitary measures (SPS Agreement),31 intellectual

25.
Generally, “dumping” refers to the practice of selling products in the
importing market at prices lower than their “normal value” (e.g., home market price,
where available). See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 2, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement].
26.
See GATT, supra note 7, art. VI(2); see also Anti-Dumping Agreement,
supra note 25, art. 9; SCM Agreement, supra note 24, art. 5.
27.
GATT, supra note 7, art. XX(a).
28.
Id. art. XX(g).
29.
Id. arts. V, XII.
30.
Veijo Heiskanen, The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law, 38
J. WORLD TRADE 1, 3–4 (2004).
The task of postwar institutional reconstruction . . . [was] to devise a
framework which would safeguard and even aid the quest for domestic stability
without, at the same time, triggering mutually destructive external
consequences that had plagued the interwar period. This was the essence of
the embedded liberalism compromise . . . .
John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 393 (1982).
31.
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, pmbl., Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S.
493, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
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property rights (TRIPS),32 technical barriers to trade (TBT
Agreement),33 and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS).34
These additional disciplines were meant to go beyond the traditional
tariff liberalization context and refocused the WTO in the direction of
trade harmonization across new regulatory areas.35 For example, a
member’s otherwise permissible discriminatory health measure may
run afoul of the new regulatory harmonization provisions contained
in the SPS Agreement if it is not based on scientific evidence.36 Thus,
where a member’s regulation would previously have been upheld as a
justified incidental restriction on trade by, for example, reliance on a
GATT exception, it may no longer be acceptable due to additional
restrictions imposed by these new trade harmonizing agreements. It
is within this legal framework that WTO litigation takes place.
III. THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON WTO ADJUDICATION OUTCOMES
Scholars have written extensively on WTO dispute settlement.
Discussion has focused on the manner in which it functions, how its
decisions are enforced, and its implications on international and
domestic law. A large portion of the trade literature applauds the
operation of the DSB as a force in promoting a stable, rules-based
international trade regime. A number of trade scholars, however,
have criticized the dispute settlement system for exhibiting an
alleged bias in favor of a particular version of free trade.
Most articles advancing such critical views have focused on casespecific examples. For instance, Tarullo examines the Appellate
Body’s application of the standard of review in cases brought under

32.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, pmbl., Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
33.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, pmbl., Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
34.
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, pmbl.,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.pdf
[hereinafter
TRIMS
Agreement].
35.
See Heiskanen, supra note 30, at 16–17 (discussing SPS, TBT and TRIPs
agreements).
36.
SPS Agreement, supra note 31, art. 2(2); see, e.g., Appellate Body Report,
European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
¶ 180, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC—Beef
Hormones].
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the Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreement.37 Tarullo focuses on disputes
arising under Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement, which contains a
provision requiring application of a Chevron-like standard of review
when considering challenges to domestic agencies’ AD decisions.38
After reviewing all Appellate Body decisions adopted between 1995
and 2001 that interpret and apply this standard, Tarullo concludes
that, with the exception of one case, the Appellate Body failed to
apply the level of deference mandated by the AD Agreement.39
Tarullo offers a series of explanations for why the Appellate Body
failed to apply the correct AD standard of review. Chief among these
is the notion that the Appellate Body is furthering the WTO
preference for free trade40 by attempting to establish a significant
role for itself in shaping the law on international trade.41 Noting
other arguments for and against the Appellate Body’s actions, Tarullo
considers whether the refusal to apply the negotiated standard will
have a negative impact on further rounds of international trade
negotiations. He suggests that countries, particularly those with
larger economies such as the United States, might be unwilling to
enter into further trade-liberalizing agreements if they perceive the
DSB system as pursuing an activist role by disregarding negotiated
standards.42
Another anecdotal study, written by Ragosta, Joneja, and
Zeldovich, is equally critical of WTO dispute settlement.43 The study
focuses on WTO cases involving trade remedy disputes and concludes
that WTO panels and the Appellate Body have been engaged in a
process of judicial activism creating a WTO “common law.”44
Specifically, the DSB has read obligations into trade disciplines
where no such obligations exist.45 The authors suggest that such
judicial activism is a result of structural problems within the system,
including the binding nature of the dispute settlement system, the
unclear and ambiguous substantive provisions of the WTO
agreements, the lack of democratic oversight of the Appellate Body

37.
Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement:
WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109, 112
(2002).
38.
Id. To the non-U.S. audience, Chevron is the short-name reference to a
famous U.S. Supreme Court decision that announced a seemingly agency-deferential
canon of statutory interpretation. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). Although not exactly identical, the language of Article
17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (discussed in Part VI.A below) resembles that of
the Chevron canon.
39.
Tarullo, supra note 37, at 147.
40.
Id. at 153.
41.
Id. at 159.
42.
Id. at 176.
43.
Ragosta et al., supra note 17, at 698.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
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and the panels, and the absence of procedural protections in the
system.46 Endorsing Tarullo’s theory, the authors assert that this
combination of factors undermines faith in the WTO system and
threatens support for additional liberalization in coming rounds of
negotiations because the sovereigns involved cannot predict the
consequences of their agreements.47
In contrast to these critical studies, most empirical scholarship
praises the operation of the DSB. Such scholarship has produced
either general descriptive statistical analyses of dispute outcomes or
hypothetico-deductive studies on specific theories, such as the
selection of defendants in WTO cases and the likelihood of settlement
of disputes. Even where empirical analysis supports the critiques
offered in the anecdotal studies previously discussed, most empirical
authors look favorably at these results, viewing them as evidence that
the WTO dispute settlement system functions according to its design
and purpose. Thus, disagreement on whether these trends are
beneficial or detrimental to the advancement of a rules-based
international trade regime remains.
Among the descriptive statistical studies, Hudec presents the
most comprehensive analysis of GATT dispute outcomes from 1948 to
1989.48 Hudec seeks to determine how effectively the GATT system
After examining
responded to “legally valid complaints.”49
complaints by decade, party type, and identity and agreement type,
Hudec concludes that the GATT dispute settlement procedure
successfully resolved a high percentage of disputes (88% overall) in
favor of complaints based on legally valid claims.50 His data also
indicates that the GATT dispute settlement system was more
responsive to the interests of stronger countries, which, according to
Hudec, is natural in a young legal system.51 Hudec also finds that
complaints involving agricultural trade are equally successful as
complaints involving nonagricultural trade. Finally, Hudec’s analysis
shows that Antidumping and Countervailing Duty (AD/CVD) cases
have a higher percentage of legal failure and a low rate of
settlement.52 He suggests that “the typical arbitrariness of AD/CVD
criteria and the legal rigidity of the measures once taken might . . .
have given them a greater than average chance of failure” and posits
that “the ascension of AD/CVD measures to a place of importance in

46.
47.
48.

Id. at 706.
Id. at 699.
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 273 (1993).
49.
Id. at 274.
50.
Id. at 353.
51.
Id. at 353–54.
52.
Id. at 355.
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national trade policy might . . . be a sign of other, deeper tendencies
toward noncompliant behavior.”53
Hudec would later extend his empirical work to an examination
of the outcomes of challenges brought against members’ measures
during the early years of the DSB’s operation.54 Hudec first observes
a dramatic increase in the volume of cases and proposes two possible
explanations for this increase.55 Relying on the fact that developed
and less developed countries had increased their complaint activity
more or less equally, Hudec postulates that the increase in case
volume was a result of the WTO members’ confidence in the new
system’s ability to remove trade restrictions.56 He also indicates that
the increase in case volume is also related to the increase in the legal
obligations arising from the creation of new WTO agreements.57
Hudec’s second major finding is a threefold increase in the percentage
of cases brought against developing countries.58 He posits that this
increase is the result of the successful effort in the Uruguay Round to
impose legal discipline on developing countries.59 To Hudec, the
growth in the use of the dispute settlement mechanism by all parties
is a welcome development toward strengthening trade as a rulesbased system.60
Building on Hudec’s work, Davey conducts a survey of the WTO
dispute settlement system in its first ten years of operation.61 He
focuses largely on the success of “major users” of the WTO dispute
settlement system in achieving their goals of enforcement of specific
agreements or trade policies.62 “Major users” are the United States,
the European Communities (EC), Canada, Japan, Brazil, and India.63
Davey examines the outcomes achieved when the “major users”
invoke the system, as well as the constraints the system places on
them as a result of initiation of proceedings by other WTO

53.
Id.
54.
Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 3 (1999).
55.
Id. at 15, 17.
56.
Id. at 22. But see Marc L. Busch et al., Does Legal Capacity Matter?
Explaining Dispute Initiation and Antidumping Actions in the WTO 1 (Int’l Ctr. for
Trade & Sustainable Dev. Programme on Dispute Settlement, Issue Paper No. 4, 2008),
available at http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/12/legal-capacity.pdf (theorizing that LDCs
are actually less likely to bring claims at the WTO due to a weaker legal capacity).
57.
Hudec, supra note 54, at 17.
58.
Id. at 24.
59.
Id. at 24–25.
60.
Id. at 23.
61.
Note that Davey looks at “disputes,” which begin at the request for
consultations. See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First
Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 18 (2005) (discussing disputes from 1995 through
1999).
62.
Id. at 25.
63.
Id.
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members.64 For example, Davey concludes that the United States
has been “quite successful” in using the WTO system to effectively
enforce two particular interests of U.S. trade policy: the TRIPS
Agreement and the SPS Agreement.65 However, as a Respondent, the
U.S. experience has been mixed in that the special standard of review
negotiated by the U.S. for AD cases has not been reflected in the
outcomes of cases; however, Davey argues that such losses have not
noticeably constrained the U.S. from imposing safeguards and
antidumping and countervailing duties.66
Dunoff also conducts a brief overview of the U.S. experience
under the WTO dispute settlement system.67 He acknowledges that
the United States has appeared either as Complainant, Respondent,
or a third party in more disputes than any other WTO member68 and
argues that, as a Complainant, the U.S. “has been successful in
virtually all of the cases it has pursued seriously.”69 Dunoff asserts
that the U.S. has complied with many of the adverse reports when it
appears as Respondent and that many of the cases the U.S. lost were
of relatively minor economic or political importance.70 To Dunoff,
U.S. compliance with WTO decisions reflects the U.S. perception that
the DSB and the WTO system of trade rules maximize U.S. economic
interests.71 He does not discuss how U.S. losses as Respondent might
affect such conclusions.
The other type of empirical analysis, the hypothetico-deductive
study of WTO outcomes, attempts to empirically verify theories
regarding the operation of the WTO dispute settlement. Some
studies focus on explaining specific features of dispute settlement
rather than formulating an overarching theory of WTO litigation.
For example, Guzman and Simmons conduct an empirical analysis of
settlements from the WTO’s inception in 1995 through 2000. They
hypothesize that, when the subject matter of a dispute is of an “all or
nothing” character, leaving little room for compromise, the parties are
less likely to settle.72 If the subject matter of the dispute is more
flexible (e.g., tariff rates), however, the parties are more likely to
negotiate a settlement.73 From their data, the authors draw several
conclusions. First, democracies are less likely to settle cases of an “all

64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 26.
66.
Id.
67.
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The United States and International Courts and Tribunal
24 (Temple Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2007-08, 2007).
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 26.
71.
See id. at 28.
72.
Guzman & Simmons, supra note 10, at 206.
73.
Id.
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or nothing” character.74 Second, democracies are significantly more
likely to resort to review by panels.75 Finally, the authors conclude
that transaction costs, such as domestic political ramifications and
legal fees associated with pursuing a case, rather than legal culture
or a high comfort level with the “rule of law,” better account for
patterns of settlement in WTO adjudication.76
A more recent study seeks to explain the overall high success
rate of Complainants at the WTO. Maton and Maton analyze the
history of WTO disputes from its creation through 2004 in an attempt
to determine whether members influence the outcomes of dispute
settlement proceedings politically rather than through legal
They first hypothesize that the greater the
argument.77
Complainant’s economic power and previous use of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU), the more likely it is that the
decision will favor the Complainant.78 Second, they hypothesize that
the EC and the United States are more likely to be successful than
other members because of their “disproportionate political leverage”
in international trade.79 Finally, they examine the effect of thirdparty participants and hypothesize that the presence of third parties
with greater economic power and prior litigation experience increases
the likelihood of Complainant success.80 In reporting their results,
the authors first confirm that Complainants have a higher success
rate (80% of all disputes) than Respondents.81 They note that
Complainants win 81.9% of panel rulings and 78.4% of Appellate
Body decisions.82 They further report that the United States and the
EC have higher than average success rates at the panel level (92%).83
However, their statistics show that the Respondent success rates of
the United States and the EC (19% and 21%, respectively) do not
match their Complainant success rates, and that these rates are
comparable to the average success rate of all Respondents (18%).84
The authors then report that the variables of economic power,
previous participation in the system, or participation of third parties
do not have a statistically significant effect on the high Complainant

74.
Id. at 227.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
John Maton & Carolyn Maton, Independence Under Fire: Extra-Legal
Pressures and Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 317
(2007).
78.
Id. at 325–26.
79.
Id. at 326.
80.
Id. at 328.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 329.
84.
See id. at 329 tbl.1.
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Success Rate at the WTO.85 They conclude by suggesting that further
research incorporating a wider range of variables is necessary to
explain the high Complainant Success Rate at the WTO.86
While it seems clear from these works that general trends can be
detected in the operation of the dispute settlement system, there is no
consensus on whether these trends will have a positive or negative
impact on the future of the WTO and the international trade regime
generally. For example, unlike Tarullo, Trachtman argues that WTO
dispute resolution is the appropriate forum for clarifying key issues
arising under the agreements, which the parties themselves have
decided not to solve at the negotiating stage.87 He supports this
assertion using insights from “incomplete contract” theory.88 This
theory posits that contracts, including trade agreements, are
incomplete in their capacity to specify in detail how norms will be
applied to future conduct.89 Focusing on the distinction between
rules (specific norms) and standards (norms of broad meaning and
application), Trachtman proposes that the WTO agreements are
“optimally incomplete,” as they include not only rules, but also
standards that give the DSB “appropriate instructions . . . to complete
the ‘contract’ in particular cases.”90 By interpreting these standards
in concrete cases, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism acts in the
manner envisaged by the WTO agreements.
Despite the
insightfulness of characterizing trade agreements as endogenously
incomplete contracts, Trachtman’s positivist approach does not
provide a comprehensive examination of how the DSB has actualized
these standards.91 Trachtman’s anecdotal study does not address
whether DSB completion of the “WTO contract” might have
consistently favored one particular set of litigants.

85.
The authors conduct both a logit and an OLS regression to test their
hypotheses. Id. at 329–30. Logit regression results indicated that none of the variables
have a statistically significant effect on the Complainant Success Rate. Id. at 330.
However, when using the OLS model, the regressors “Difference in Previous Use” and
“Difference in Third Party Numbers” become statistically significant. Id. at 331.
However, the empirical literature does not condone the use of OLS regression analysis
where dichotomous dependent variables are present because the general assumptions
of OLS regression are violated. See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 594
(4th ed. 2003).
86.
See Maton & Maton, supra note 77, at 334.
87.
Trachtman, supra note 13, at 333–34.
88.
Id. at 334.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 346.
91.
Trachtman’s study examines only two instances in which the Appellate
Body “completed the contract”: Appellate Body Report, United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter US—Shrimp/Turtle], and Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998). Trachtman,
supra note 13, at 334–35.
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None of these studies attempts to develop an overarching theory
regarding the determinants of the higher rate of Complainant success
in WTO litigation. This Article expands on the existing literature in
two key ways. First, it takes advantage of a more detailed data set to
analyze the outcomes of all WTO cases through September 2007 to
determine if any discernable pattern in these outcomes can explain
the high Complainant Success Rate. In doing so, it examines several
litigation-based variables, including type of litigant, level of
development, and subject matter of the litigation. It then subjects
these variables to statistical testing. Only with such statistical
verification is it possible to discern whether the WTO dispute
settlement system in fact favors a specific type of party or interest.
Second, this Article adds a new perspective to the debate on why the
WTO dispute settlement system functions as it does by proposing
biased rule development as the explanation for the asymmetric
nature of WTO dispute outcomes.
IV. DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data and Methods
1.

Defining a Case

For purposes of this Article, a “case” is a dispute in which a WTO
member has requested that a panel be established by the DSB
pursuant to the provisions of the DSU.92 This, however, is not the
first opportunity for potential litigants to avail themselves of their
rights as WTO members. When a member believes that a benefit
accruing to it under any of the GATT/WTO agreements has been
nullified or impaired by a measure taken by another member,93 it
may request consultations with the “infringing” member.94 These
consultations are similar to the informal negotiating process that
ordinarily occurs when two parties meet before one decides to file a
complaint with a domestic court. Studies of patterns in domestic
adjudication do not consider settlement activity that takes place
before the filing of a complaint, as obtaining data on such activity is

92.
See DSU, supra note 7, art. 6.
93.
GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(1)(a). A member may also claim that
another member’s measure effectively deprives it of a benefit accruing under the
agreements, even though the measure does not violate a specific provision of the WTO
agreements. Id. art. XXIII(1)(b).
94.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 4; GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(1). A complaining
party must notify the DSB in writing when it requests consultations with another
member to settle a matter before requesting a panel. DSU, supra note 7, art. 4(4).
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not feasible.95 To render WTO adjudication comparable to domestic
litigation, one must use consistent concepts. Therefore, instead of
looking at requests for consultations as the formal commencement of
WTO adjudication, this study considers the panel request as the
functional equivalent to filing a complaint in the domestic system.96
Indeed, as in a domestic system, it is only upon a member’s
request to establish a panel that the DSB can exercise its “judicial”
jurisdiction, or, in WTO parlance, its “terms of reference.”97 Prior
consultations, on the other hand, are merely a pre-litigation
requirement designed to encourage cooperation among potential
litigants. They operate much like notice-of-claim requirements in
ordinary litigation, since they do not require any supervisory act by
the adjudicating court.98 Moreover, panel requests, unlike requests
for consultations, share a number of characteristics with domestic
complaints: they are “made in writing”;99 they identify the offending
conduct or omission (i.e., the “measure”);100 and they provide “a

95.
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet
Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 755–56 (1992). A general
criticism applicable to empirical scholarship on litigation is that it focuses on too
restrictive a set of disputes—those that are actually filed—to reach conclusions about
the general nature of litigation. While the inability to study litigants whom one never
sees can limit one’s ability to fully model all litigation-related activity, it does not
constitute an insurmountable barrier to understanding WTO adjudication. Studies of
other litigation contexts reveal that “the linkage between developments among legal
stages” of litigation “extend[s] back to the pre-filing settlement stage.” Id. at 757 (citing
other studies). As potential WTO complainants recognize that Complainants
traditionally have fared very well in the bulk of observed disputes, it is more than
plausible that they have become more and more confident and filed more requests for
panels. Also, in litigation settings where plaintiffs are not likely to get any meaningful
relief unless they sue, the existence of “might have been” plaintiffs is inconsequential.
For the many reasons discussed in Part V, WTO Respondents might be reluctant to
offer settlement concessions. This minimizes WTO Complainants’ chances to obtain
meaningful relief via pre-adjudication settlement, thereby forcing them to request the
formation of a panel. Thus, the number of “might have been” WTO Complainants who
refrain from suing after obtaining full redress of their grievances at the pre-panel
request stage is likely quite limited.
96.
For a discussion on the comparability of the WTO dispute settlement
system to domestic court systems, see Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A
Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 225 (2008) (“Among international
tribunals, the WTO’s [Appellate Body] is arguably the most like domestic courts.”).
97.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 7.
98.
See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (rejecting application of
a state statute-mandated notice-of-claim requirement in federal civil rights litigation);
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987)
(“[Under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A), part of the Clean Water Act], the purpose of [prelitigation] notice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into
complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen
suit.”).
99.
Compare DSU, supra note 7, art. 6(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (civil action
commences with the filing of a complaint).
100.
Compare DSU, supra note 7, art. 6(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (short
and plain statement of the claim).

400

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 42:383

summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the
problem clearly.”101 Finally, analysis of the GATT and DSU texts
supports the distinction drawn here between requests for
consultations and panel requests.102 In sum, members’ requests for
the establishment of panels are the WTO counterpart to domestic
complaint filings, which constitute the unit of analysis of studies
conducted under the traditional positive theory of litigation.
2.

Determining Case Outcomes

A case is considered to have a final outcome when the DSB
adopts a panel or Appellate Body report. A “settled” case is any case
in which: (1) the complaining party withdraws the panel request;
(2) the DSB defers the establishment of a panel103 (usually due to a
responding party’s request) and the complaining party has not
renewed its original request in the past three years;104 (3) the DSB
establishes a panel105 but there has been no reported activity in the
past three years; (4) the parties request that a panel stop its work106
and the panel has remained inactive for twelve months; or (5) the
parties officially notify the DSB that they have reached an agreed
solution.107 Finally, a case is considered “active” when a panel
request has been made and the panel or Appellate Body is currently
working toward a formal disposition of the case. The following table
contains a breakdown of all WTO cases from January 1995 through
September 2007:

101.
Compare DSU, supra note 7, art. 6(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (short
and plain statement of the claim).
102.
See GATT, supra note 7, arts. XXII, XXIII (distinguishing between
consultations and requests for panels after no satisfactory adjustment is reached); see
also DSU, supra note 7, arts. 1, 3(5) (listing separately consultations and invocation of
the dispute resolution process), 4(7) (discussing the procedure to be followed during
consultations), 6 (discussing the process for requesting panel and requiring
Complainants to state that consultations have been held).
103.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 6(1).
104.
In this study, this means any case that has remained inactive since
September 2004.
105.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 6.
106.
Id. art. 12(12).
107.
Id. art. 3(6).
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TABLE A: STATUS OF CASES
Case Status

Number of Cases

DSB Adopted Report
Settled
Active

105
44
29

Total

178

Litigants’ success rates are calculated from the universe of
adopted decisions. A Complainant wins a case any time the
Respondent’s measure is deemed not in compliance with the
Respondent’s WTO obligations. Conversely, a finding that at least
one of Respondent’s measures “impairs or nullifies” Complainant’s
cognizable rights under the “covered agreements” was coded as a
Respondent loss, because at that point the Respondent is ordinarily
under an obligation to bring the defeated measure into compliance.108
After determining the overall success rate of Complainants and
Respondents (the dependent variable), the study attempted to
ascertain whether litigants’ success rates correlate with a host of
potential explanatory factors.
Factors tested included type of
agreement invoked (e.g., trade remedy vs. non-trade remedy
agreement), litigant identity (e.g., U.S., EC, Brazil, India, etc.), level
of litigant’s development (e.g., First World vs. Third World), existence
and type of litigant coalitions (e.g., Complainants from multiple
countries), and type of product involved (e.g., commodities vs.
noncommodities).
Should Complainant Success Rates remain
unchanged regardless of the independent factor tested, then one can
safely conclude that no particular case or litigant variables can
account for litigant success. Thus, absent asymmetric information or
stake asymmetries (or both) among Complainants and Respondents,
the detection of a sustained pattern of success by Complainants
would indicate that the results might instead be caused by some
inherent property of the WTO dispute settlement system.

108.
Another study, focusing on the 1995 to 2000 period, reported that
Complainants succeeded in obtaining full or partial victories (“concessions”) in 79% of
all disputes. See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J.
WORLD TRADE 719, 725 (2003).
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B. Results
As discussed in Part III, prior studies have detected some
general trends in WTO adjudication, with the high Complainant
Success Rate being the most significant. However, none of these
studies examined whether such rates vary in response to the subject
matter of a case, the identity of litigants, or change due to some other
litigation-related factor. A party’s overall high success rate cannot
alone explain what other factors might be influencing litigation
results. This Part presents Complainant win rates along several
different categories of cases and litigants and empirically tests
whether variations within these categories have any statistical
impact on such rates. To avoid double-counting, only the outcomes
from panel and Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB are
used.109
Table B.1 indicates that Complainant Success Rates vary
between 83% and 91% across all Case Types.110 To test whether Case
Type is statistically correlated with Complainant Success, I
performed Fisher’s Exact Tests on cross-tabulations of these two
variables and found no significant correlation.111 Furthermore,
nothing in the Appellate Body’s decisions reveals that it distinguishes
between trade remedy and non-trade remedy cases.
That the Complainant Success Rate appears unaffected by
differences in Case Types is remarkable for at least two reasons.
First, one would expect that in trade remedy cases—of which
approximately half (twenty-two) are challenges to (Respondent)
agencies’ antidumping rulings—Complainants would have a lower
rate of success than in non-trade remedy cases. Under the AD
Agreement, agencies’ factual and legal determinations are owed a
heightened, Chevron-like level of deference.112 Presumably, this
should result in fewer Complainant wins in AD cases and, thus,

109.
The DSB does not consider panel reports for adoption when “a party to the
dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal.” DSU, supra note 7, art.
16(4). However, panel analyses comprise a significant portion of DSB adoptions, as the
Appellate Body has affirmed 91% of all panel decisions
110.
Cases involving challenges to both trade remedies and non-trade remedies
were excluded to avoid double-counting. Similarly, simultaneous challenges under the
AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement were excluded. However, the excluded
AD/SCM mixed cases were counted in the general trade remedy category. This
counting methodology was applied to overlapping categories reported in the tables
below.
111.
The statistical results discussed in Part B (Fisher’s Exact Tests, two-tailed)
were obtained from cross-tabulations of the independent variables displayed in the left
columns of the tables below and Complainant Success Rate, the sole dependent
variable studied.
112.
See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 25, art. 17.6 (stating that a
measure will be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon a permissible
interpretation of law).
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produce a lower Complainant Success Rate in trade remedy cases
than in non-trade remedy cases. Quite simply, outcome expectations
based on the AD Agreement’s more Respondent-friendly standard did
not result in a lower rate of Complainant wins in this category of
cases.
Second, among trade remedy cases, one would expect
challenges to AD decisions to result in a lower percentage of
Complainant wins than in subsidy cases (i.e., cases under the
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement) since the
AD Agreement expressly prescribes a stringent standard of review
while the SCM Agreement does not.113 Yet, the Complainant Success
Rate in SCM cases (86%) was actually lower than in AD cases (91%),
although the difference is not statistically significant. That the AD
Agreement’s prescribed level of deference has not resulted in lower
Complainant Success Rates in statistical—or even in relative
percentage—terms is both surprising and revealing. This evidence
seems to support Tarullo’s comment that the Appellate Body has
disregarded the heightened AD standard of review.114
TABLE B.1: COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE BY CASE TYPE
Case Type

Complainant Success Rate

Trade Remedy
AD
SCM

88.89%
90.91%
86.36%

Non-Trade Remedy

83.33%

Note: Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between categories
(rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically significant
results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).

Because case-specific distinctions cannot explain litigant success,
one turns to Party Identity as a potential explanatory variable. Of
the 105 adopted DSB reports, the U.S. and the EC have been the two

113.
The question of which standard of review applies in SCM cases was hotly
contested and (apparently) ultimately settled by the Appellate Body in United States—
Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000)
[hereinafter US—Leaded Bar]. In that case, when presented with a Ministerial
Declaration recognizing the need to apply a common standard of review to both AD and
SCM cases, the Appellate Body refused to apply the AD Agreement’s standard of
review in the SCM context. According to the Appellate Body, the Declaration was
merely hortatory. Cf. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 122, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001)
[hereinafter US—Shrimp/Turtle Compliance] (emphasis added) (recognizing that
declarations can be binding on WTO members). These two cases are discussed in detail
in Part VI.B below.
114.
Tarullo, supra note 37, at 118.
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most frequent Complainants, with 29 and 25 appearances
respectively (51% of all cases). If litigant success is related to Party
Identity, cases involving the two most litigious WTO members might
serve as a test for such a relationship. As First World countries with
presumably more resources dedicated to prosecuting WTO cases, the
U.S. and the EC should have higher Complainant Success Rates.115
Indeed, as Table B.2 illustrates, U.S. and EC success rates as
Complainants are quite high—83% for the U.S. and 96% for the EC in
all cases, regardless of subject matter. However, cross-tabulations of
Party Identity against Complainant Success Rate show that Party
Identity is not a statistically significant factor, either in the aggregate
or within any particular case category. Similarly, an examination of
cases where the U.S. and the EC appear as sole Complainants reveals
that their lone appearance is not statistically correlated with their
respective success rates. Finally, as in Table B.1 (all countries), the
percentage of U.S. and EC wins is systematically higher in trade
remedy cases than otherwise, although this difference is not
statistically significant.
TABLE B.2: COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE BY PARTY IDENTITY
(U.S. & EC)
Party Identity
U.S.

Complainant Success Rate
82.76%

Trade Remedy (5)116
AD (1)
SCM (3)

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

Non-Trade Remedy

79.17%

115.
For purposes of this study, a First World country is a “high income
economy” according the World Bank Country Classification by income. Conversely, for
purposes of this study, a Third World country is any country classified otherwise. See
World Bank Country Classification, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~
piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (describing the
World Bank’s classification of countries and providing a table showing each country’s
current classification).
116.
Of the five trade remedy cases the U.S. brought, Mexico—Rice was
discarded from the pure AD and SCM count because it is both an AD and an SCM case.
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice,
WT/DS295/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2005). Such mixed cases were similarly discarded
throughout Part B. They were, however, included in the overall trade remedy count.
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Party Identity
U.S. Alone

Complainant Success Rate
75.00%

Trade Remedy (3)
AD (1)
SCM (1)

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

Non-Trade Remedy

70.59%

EC

96.00%

Trade Remedy
AD (3)
SCM (5)

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

Non-Trade Remedy

90.91%

EC Alone

405

94.74%

Trade Remedy
AD (3)
SCM (4)

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

Non-Trade Remedy

88.89%

Notes: Where a category has five or fewer cases, the number of cases is indicated in
parentheses. Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between
categories (rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically
significant results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).

While Party Identity cannot account for the high Complainant
Success Rate of the most litigious First World WTO members, one
may still wonder if it might explain the Complainant Success Rates of
the two most litigious Third World WTO members: Brazil (11 cases)
and India (8 cases). Table B.3 indicates that Brazil and India have
very high rates of success as Complainants. Overall, Brazil has won
all of its cases and India has succeeded in all but one case it has
brought so far (an 88% win rate). As with the U.S. and the EC, crosstabulations of Party Identity against Complainant Success Rate
showed that identity has no statistically significant correlation with a
party’s win rate, either in the aggregate or within any particular Case
Type. Similarly, appearances by Brazil (100% win rate) and India
(83% win rate) as sole Complainants were not statistically correlated
with their success as complainants. In keeping with the trend
observed in Tables B.1 (all countries) and B.2 (U.S. and EC), the
percentage of Brazilian and Indian wins is systematically higher in
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trade remedy cases than otherwise, but, again, this difference is not
statistically significant.
TABLE B.3: COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE BY PARTY IDENTITY
(BRAZIL & INDIA)
Party Identity
Brazil

Complainant Success Rate
100.00%

Trade Remedy
AD (2)
SCM (4)

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

Non-Trade Remedy (3)

100.00%

Brazil Alone

100.00%

Trade Remedy (5)
AD (2)
SCM (3)

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

Non-Trade Remedy (1)

100.00%

India

87.50%

Trade Remedy (3)
AD (1)
SCM (0)

100.00%
100.00%
---

Non-Trade Remedy

80.00%

India Alone

83.33%

Trade Remedy (2)
AD (1)
SCM (0)

100.00%
100.00%
---

Non-Trade Remedy (4)

75.00%

Notes: Where a category has five or fewer cases, the number of cases is indicated in
parentheses. Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between
categories (rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically
significant results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).

Arguably, a finding of no causation between Party Identity and
Complainant success based on data that includes all litigants, or on a
sample of the two most litigious First and Third World WTO
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members, cannot by itself eliminate the possibility that Complainant
win rates might be related to some other country-based explanation.
One might posit, for instance, that a country’s success as a
Complainant might be related to its level of income, even if this
relationship could not be detected among the two most litigious
members of each group tested above. Indeed, working with larger
samples by switching from dual-country to multiple-country analysis
increases the chances of finding statistically significant relationships.
Among the 105 adopted reports, First World countries initiated
anywhere between 56% (59 cases brought solely by First World
countries) and 70% of the empanelled WTO disputes (73 cases,
including those brought with Third World countries as co-plaintiffs),
while Third World countries were Complainants between 28% (29
cases brought exclusively by Third World countries) and 35% (37
cases, including those brought with First World countries as coplaintiffs) of the time.
As in prior tests, I looked at whether the dependent variable
Complainant Success Rate changed as Income Level varied. Table
B.4 shows that Complainant Success Rates did vary between 84% (for
all cases involving First World Complainants) and 92% (all cases
involving Third World Complainants). First World-Complainant-only
cases showed an 80% win rate, while cases prosecuted solely by Third
World Complainants showed a win rate of 90%. These results
conform to the overall pattern of high Complainant success in WTO
litigation and appear to contradict the assumption that First World
Complainants would fare better in WTO litigation. However, these
results provide no evidence of a statistically significant relationship
between a member’s Income Level and its likelihood of success as a
Complainant. Fisher’s Exact Tests on cross-tabulations between
these two variables produced no statistical correlation, either by
combining all cases together or by segregating them by subject
matter.
I also detected another familiar trend: despite the lack of
statistical significance, the percentage of First and Third World
Complainant wins is systematically higher in trade remedy cases
than in non-trade remedy cases.117 This pattern is puzzling given the
differences in the text, declarations, and Appellate Body-approved

117.
The only exception is the Third World “all cases” sample. However, even
this exception deserves some qualification. As in all other instances, the rate of
Complainant success in AD cases is still relatively higher than or the same as the
success rate in SCM cases, though the difference is not statistically significant. As
discussed above, one would expect that the AD Agreement’s more agency-deferential
standard of review would translate into more agency or Respondent wins (i.e., more
Complainant losses) than in SCM cases, since the Appellate Body determined that the
AD standard does not apply to cases under the SCM Agreement. See supra note 116
and accompanying text.
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interpretations of the WTO agreements.
With AD challenges
constituting about half of all trade remedy disputes, one would expect
the more Respondent-deferential AD standard of review to depress
the Complainant Success Rate in the trade remedy category. Even if
one believed that WTO dispute resolution was created to favor
Complainants, such belief would not be antithetical to the expectation
that, at least in AD cases, a stricter standard of review should have
some discernible impact on the results of WTO adjudication.
TABLE B.4: COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE BY INCOME LEVEL
Income Level
First World

Complainant Success Rate
83.56%

Trade Remedy
AD
SCM

88.24%
90.00%
86.67%

Non-Trade Remedy

80.56%

First World Alone

79.66%

Trade Remedy
AD
SCM

85.71%
90.00%
83.33%

Non-Trade Remedy

75.86%

Third World

91.89%

Trade Remedy
AD
SCM

91.30%
91.67%
87.50%

Non-Trade Remedy

92.86%

Third World Alone

89.66%

Trade Remedy
AD
SCM

90.00%
91.67%
85.71%

Non-Trade Remedy

88.89%

Note: Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between categories
(rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically significant
results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).
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Because Case Type, Party Identity, and Income Level cannot
account for the high rate of Complainant success in WTO litigation,
one must look beyond the impact of substantive variables to the
potential role that interactions among members may have on
adjudication. Specifically, one would expect that joint appearances as
Complainants would lead to more wins than solo appearances.
Presumably, countries acting together increase their chances of
success, not only by drawing more attention to the legal issues
implicated in a case, but also by exerting greater pressure on the
adjudicators to base their decisions along more majoritarian lines.
Furthermore, co-Complainants can pool their resources and consult
with one another throughout the process. Indeed, in no other
configuration were Complainants more successful than in the sixteen
cases in which at least two of them appeared together.
Table B.5 shows that multiple Complainants have a perfect
record as WTO litigants, both in the aggregate and by Case Type.
Similarly, different combinations of First and Third World countries
produced the same level of success. At first, it appeared that in a
system in which complainants have been very successful, this pooling
effect might compound their chances of prevailing in litigation. To
detect whether multiple-Complainant appearances were statistically
correlated with Complainant success, I performed Fisher’s Exact
Tests on several cross-tabulations, but again found no statistically
significant correlation, either in the aggregate or within any
particular Case Type.
TABLE B.5: EFFECT OF MULTIPLE COMPLAINANTS ON
COMPLAINANT SUCCESS RATE
Multiple Complainant
Appearances
All Cases

Complainant Success
Rate
100.00%

Trade Remedy
AD (0)
SCM (3)

100.00%
--100.00%

Non-Trade Remedy

100.00%

U.S. & EC (3)

100.00%

Trade Remedy (1)
AD (0)
SCM (1)

100.00%
--100.00%

Non-Trade Remedy (2)

100.00%
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Multiple Complainant
Appearances
Brazil & India (1)

Complainant Success
Rate
100.00%

Trade Remedy (1)
AD (0)
SCM (0)

100.00%
-----

Non-Trade Remedy (0)

---

First World & Third World (5)
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100.00%

Trade Remedy (3)
AD (0)
SCM (1)

100.00%
--100.00%

Non-Trade Remedy (2)

100.00%

Notes: Where a category has five or fewer cases, the number of cases is indicated in
parentheses. Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between
categories (rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically
significant results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).

Having discarded Complainant interaction and other variables
as explanations for Complainant success, I tested whether the
Product Type implicated in a particular challenged measure could
affect Complainants’ win rate. Because commodities are a traditional
export from mature industries in both First and Third World
countries, they are typical candidates for trade-restricting measures
on the part of importing countries (i.e., Respondents).118 Indeed, as
scarcely differentiated goods, commodities are often in direct
competition with nationally-sourced goods and are likely targets of
protectionist measures; therefore, they are regularly involved in WTO
disputes.119 Once challenged at the WTO, the logic goes, these
commodity-restricting measures are more likely to be defeated than
measures in noncommodity cases. This is so because commodityrestricting measures could be the product of collective action by rent-

118.
For coding purposes, I relied on the MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics’
definition of “commodity” to distinguish between commodities and noncommodities.
Specifically, a merchandise qualifies as a commodity if it is a “raw foodstuff or
material” and is “widely traded internationally in organised markets.” THE MIT
DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 68 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992).
119.
Note that despite the low degree of differentiation among commodities,
developed countries often export and import the “same” commodities to each other
because commodities, though often similar, are not necessarily identical. Research on
intra-industry trade in the international economics subdiscipline has long recognized
this feature of developed-country trade. See, e.g., HERBERT G. GRUBEL & P.J. LLOYD,
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE: THE THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 14 (1975).
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seeking, less-dynamic domestic producers, which might not have the
requisite political clout to preserve their domestic successes against
the background of the higher, multisector considerations involved in
WTO sovereign adjudication.120 If these assumptions are correct, one
would expect WTO challenges to measures restricting commodity
trade to have a high percentage of Complainant wins, with WTO
dispute settlement functioning as the ultimate check on such
protectionism. Should this occur, and should Product Type turn out
to be statistically correlated with Complainant Success Rate, the
reason for such high win rates would be explained.
As Table B.6 illustrates, commodity cases do indeed have a high
rate of Complainant success (90% of 48 cases), but so do
noncommodity cases (82% of 57 cases). It is no surprise then that
cross-tabulations of Product Type against Complainant Success Rate
show no statistically significant correlation between the two
variables. As in every test conducted in this study, the high
Complainant Success Rate simply cannot be explained by any case or
litigant-intrinsic characteristic.
TABLE B.6: EFFECT OF PRODUCT TYPE ON COMPLAINANT
SUCCESS RATE
Product Type

Complainant Success Rate

Commodity

89.58%

Noncommodity

82.46%

Note: Difference-of-proportion tests performed on success rates between categories
(rows) and within subcategories (indented rows) yielded no statistically significant
results (p-values > .05 (one-tailed)).

Since none of the tested variables can account for WTO
Complainants’ high success rates, one must wonder whether some allencompassing, systemic factor might be at work. Indeed, these rates
occur regardless of case or litigant characteristics. The remainder of

120.
Prior empirical research in the context of U.S. judicial and NAFTA Chapter
19 trade remedy litigation reveals that domestic commodity producer rent-seeking
behavior cannot explain their high rate of success at the agency level. See Juscelino F.
Colares, An Empirical Examination of Product and Litigant-Specific Theories for the
Divergence Between NAFTA Chapter 19 and U.S. Judicial Review, 42 J. WORLD TRADE
691, 709 (2008) (“[M]any investigations of commodities, like Softwood Lumber, Pork
and Wheat, involve at least as concentrated downstream U.S. consuming industries as
they involve U.S. producers seeking trade barriers.”). Because members of large or
more concentrated commodity importing industries and their foreign industry allies
can be just as well organized for collective action as the domestic producing industry,
they often are well positioned to offset domestic producers’ rent-seeking attempts at
winning domestic-agency protection.
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this article discusses some potential explanations of the systemic
prevalence of high Complainant Success Rates.
V. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
A. Case Selection Effect and the Results of WTO Dispute Settlement
One could argue that a case selection effect undermines any
conclusion regarding the general nature of WTO dispute
settlement.121 Since the sustained pattern of Complainant success is
based on observing only fully adjudicated disputes, the high
percentage of Complainant wins describes at most the characteristics
of fully adjudicated disputes, rather than the characteristics of the
entire universe of disputes brought before the DSB system.122
However, the case selection effect fails as an alternative explanation
in the WTO context for two basic reasons.
First, case selection as a result of settlement agreements has
little effect on the DSB system, where approximately 70% of all cases
in which a panel is requested are fully adjudicated without settlement
(105 of 149 cases).123 These statistics are in stark contrast to
patterns observed in U.S. civil litigation, where only 1.8%124 of
federal civil cases125 are fully adjudicated and up to 72% of the
disputes are terminated due to settlements.126 The low frequency of
WTO settlement activity undercuts the selection argument, as the

121.
See Priest & Klein, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing that doctrinal information
has disclosed little about how legal rules affect behavior or affect the generation of
legal disputes).
122.
For reasons discussed in Part IV.A.1 supra, the reader should recall that
the formal commencement of WTO litigation for purposes of this study is triggered by
the request for a panel. Therefore, cases dropped before a request for a panel is made
are not part of the population of disputes investigated in this study.
123.
See supra tbl. A.
124.
Percentage from 2002. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004).
125.
Note that even in the realm of litigation that often involves high monetary
stakes and litigants with substantial resources, such as intellectual property cases, the
rate of trials as a percentage of dispositions is very low (2.4% in the U.S.). See id. at
463; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2007 PATENT AND TRADEMARK DAMAGES STUDY
(2007), available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/3ca24a75615f0394802
5711e004b69a0/$file/2007_Patent_Study.pdf (reporting that the median award amount
for 2005 was $6,000,000). The much lower settlement-to-total-number-of-disputes ratio
in WTO litigation makes WTO outcomes much more representative of overall
litigation.
126.
See Gillian Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil
Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 729–33 (2004) (using data from 2000,
including consent judgments, but not cases disposed of through abandonment or
default).
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subset of fully adjudicated disputes represents such a large portion of
the entire universe of disputes. More importantly, Complainants are
winning more cases, not fewer, even after one excludes their
presumably stronger, settled cases.
Second, even assuming the presence of a selection effect in the
70% of disputes reaching full adjudication, this effect cannot account
for the magnitude of the win rate disparity between Complainants
and Respondents. Complainant Success Rates ranging from 83% to
91% across all Case Types are a substantial deviation from the 50%
success rate expected under random litigation assumptions.127 Thus,
even if a residual selection effect exists here—because cases decided
do not comprise 100% of all empanelled cases—such a large deviation
in litigant success rates is too substantial and systematic to be
attributed to case selection alone.
B. Effect of Settlement Constraints on WTO Adjudication
The relative low frequency of settlement activity in WTO
adjudication in comparison to ordinary adjudication merits
consideration beyond the case selection context. The presence and
potential importance of settlement constraints in WTO adjudication
could be a systemic explanation for WTO dispute outcomes.
Specifically, a low level of settlement activity in WTO litigation (only
about 30% of all litigation) might be the reason for such high
Complainant Success Rates. If, due to some feature of the WTO
system’s design, members face significant settlement constraints, the
occurrence of high Complainant success might be attributed to
Respondents’ inability to settle.
A previous study suggests that informal constraints, such as
members’ inability to make deals involving transfers in unrelated
areas or members’ general reluctance to procure settlement via cash
payments, reduce the scope and the possibility of settlement in WTO
litigation.128 It also proposes that the operation of the MFN principle
further limits members’ willingness to enter into settlements because
they hesitate to offer concessions that “may have to be granted to

127.
The Author is aware of only one other adjudicatory system that has
produced higher plaintiff success rates: the Japanese criminal justice system, where
conviction rates exceed 99%. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the
Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53–54 (2001). However, the
authors of this study demonstrate these high conviction rates result from case selection
and low prosecutorial budgets, as “understaffed prosecutors present judges with only
the most obviously guilty defendants.” Id. at 53. This phenomenon does not appear to
occur in WTO adjudication, where the “prosecutor” is necessarily a sovereign
government who typically has more budgetary discretion than a prosecutor in criminal
proceedings.
128.
Guzman & Simmons, supra note 10, at 210–11.
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every WTO member state.”129 One could thus hypothesize that the
combined effect of these institutional characteristics has a depressing
effect on the rate of settlements in WTO litigation. At first glance,
the low settlement rate verified in WTO adjudication seems to
support this hypothesis.130
However, before one can conclude that settlement constraints are
the driving forces behind the highly asymmetric pattern of
Complainant and Respondent Success Rates, it must first be shown
that these constraints indeed influence members’ litigation behavior.
Taking the operation of the MFN principle and other settlement
constraints into account, one would expect that a Respondent’s trade
dependence affects its attitude toward settlement. Specifically,
Respondents with higher trade-to-GDP ratios should have lower
settlement rates due to their heavier reliance on trade. Such reliance
on trade should cause Respondents to hesitate extending settlement
offers, because whatever special concession they offer to
Complainants must necessarily be granted to other WTO members,
creating potential broad repercussions in their economies.131
Conversely, if settlement constraints significantly influence
Respondents’ litigation behavior, Respondents with lower trade
dependence should be more inclined to settle, because any concession
granted would have a comparatively smaller impact on their overall
economy.
To determine whether Respondents’ litigation behavior is
susceptible to settlement constraints, I obtained each Respondent’s
trade-to-GDP ratio132 and then regressed this ratio against its
settlement rate.133 The goal was to ascertain whether a Respondent’s
trade dependence, as measured by its trade-to-GDP ratio, affected its
attitude toward settlement as demonstrated by its settlement rate. I
also looked at Respondents’ import-to-GDP ratios as an alternative
regressor. Arguably, a country’s import level most directly reflects
the effects of settlement concessions, as other trade partners are
likely to take advantage of removed restrictions on trade.

129.
Id. at 210.
130.
To be clear, Guzman & Simmons did not propose that settlement
constraints provide a systemic explanation for WTO outcomes. See id. Rather, this
author uses their observation regarding settlement constraints to test whether these
constraints have a significant impact on the overall pattern of WTO outcomes.
131.
Viewed in this way, the MFN principle operates in the settlement context
much like res judicata does in the ordinary adjudication context.
132.
Data on Respondents' overall merchandise trade (export + imports) and
GDP was obtained from each member’s “Trade Profile” in the WTO Website. World
Trade Organization, Trade Profiles, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountry
PFReporter.aspx?Language=E (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). All figures were calculated
in 2005 U.S. dollars. Id.
133.
Respondents’ settlement rates were calculated as the ratio between number
of cases settled and the total number of cases.
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Table C reports the results of these two linear regressions.
These models show that the economic dimension of settlement
constraints, as reflected in Respondents’ overall trade or import
levels, is likely not affecting Respondents’ attitudes toward
settlement. None of these models or their regressors was statistically
significant at the .05 probability level. Furthermore, since one can be
95% confident that the intervals around each regression coefficient
contain the true regression slope, and because each interval includes
a value of zero, Respondents’ concerns over the potential economic
impact of concessions likely have had no impact on their settlement
behavior.
TABLE C: REGRESSION MODELS OF SETTLEMENT RATE
N

[95% Conf.
Interval]

t
(p-value)

Model’s F
(p-value)

R2/Adj-R2

Regressors based
on Respondents’
Trade Profile:
trade-to-GDP
(tGDP)
.109
(.214)

27

[-.332

.549]

.510
(.616)

.260
(.616)

.010/-.029

import-to-GDP
(iGDP)
.106
(.441)

27

[-.802

1.015]

.240
(.812)

.060
(.812)

.002/-.0376

Notes: Regressor coefficients and standard errors are presented below regressors.
Models’ intercepts are not reported. Regressor and model test statistics and their pvalues (in parentheses) are reported in separate columns. Both models were estimated
by using the “regress” command in Stata (v.9.2).

Because the potential economic effect of settlement concessions is
not correlated with settlement rates, one must deduce that settlement
constraints have not influenced Respondent settlement calculus.
Thus, although potentially having a settlement-depressing influence,
settlement constraints cannot alone account for the extreme
imbalance between Complainant and Respondent success in
litigation. The magnitude of the outcome asymmetry is too great to
be explained by an otherwise empirically minor feature of the system.
Perhaps the existence of certain built-in incentives for full
adjudication offers a better explanation for the low settlement rate
than does a theory of settlement constraints. The WTO litigation
system and its associated expenses are largely a sunk cost. “Court”
costs are covered by members’ contributions, and most WTO legal
representation is institutionally built into governmental budgets.
Therefore, WTO members are not exposed to all of the financial
constraints that confront ordinary litigants. Yet, adjudication does
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present an opportunity cost.
Trade diplomats are also busy
conducting further rounds of negotiations and complying with their
countries’ trade policy reporting requirements, when they are not
already involved in other litigation. In any case, WTO members’
reluctance to settle is likely the result of a much more complex
calculus than the mere existence of settlement constraints
suggests.134
C. Asymmetry of Information and Asymmetry of Stakes
It is possible that the relatively high frequency of proComplainant outcomes in WTO litigation is simply the result of
better-informed Complainants whose cases are also meritorious.
Indeed, some non-trade studies have pointed to instances in ordinary
litigation where better-informed plaintiffs systematically bring cases
and litigate them more effectively than defendants.135 To date,
however, there is no empirical support for this type of claim in the
WTO context. In fact, the finding that country identity, income level,
and case subject matter play no part in WTO litigation undermines
the case for any information advantage by Complainants alone.
Thus, a thesis that Complainants, as the “haves” in WTO litigation,
are the likely successful litigants, and Respondents, as the “have
nots,” are the likely losers, has no empirical support. Where
Complainant Success Rates cannot be attributed to any particular
plaintiff characteristic or Case Type, and where no evidence exists to
support any information advantage by Complainants, it is highly
unlikely that some undetected and systemic information asymmetry
is causing these results. Furthermore, there does not seem to be any
theoretical support for this view. As in ordinary litigation, WTO
litigants face similar, albeit not necessarily identical, economic
incentives. Governments on each side are pressured by domestic
interests who are more than willing to close any perceived
information gaps in their government’s cases. Thus, these incentives
typically keep governments “honest” and discourage weak
representation.

134.
See infra Part V.D–E (discussing whether this calculus and Respondents’
inability to settle might be the result of a faulty assessment of the system in which
they operate).
135.
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff
Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92, S109 (1997)
(acknowledging that differing information available to plaintiffs and defendants may
be a factor in trial outcomes); Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 29, 29–30 (1995) (asserting that asymmetric information about the likely
outcome at trial plays a large role in the decision to go to trial or settle); Keith N.
Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 187, 189 (1993) (suggesting that strategic behavior stemming from an
informational advantage is necessary to explain litigation patterns).
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Under a different theory, one could argue that Complainants, as
the initiators of litigation, are more invested in judicial disputes due
to their condition as “aggrieved” parties. This self-perception might
provide Complainants with the impetus to invest more resources and
effort in prosecuting their cases, thus producing stake asymmetry.
However, the rationale applicable to information asymmetry applies
equally here. For instance, as the discussion of the role of the MFN
principle in the settlement context illustrates, Respondents are fully
aware of the res judicata implications of a settlement offer and are
just as interested as Complainants in presenting a strong case.
Moreover, even when facing a weak case on the merits, a strategically
minded senior trade bureaucrat might find a well-fought WTO loss
much more politically palatable than the offer of a meaningful
settlement to a Complainant that might disappoint electoral
Thus, stake asymmetry cannot theoretically or
interests.136
empirically explain the discrepancy in Complainant and Respondent
win rates.
Simply put, the highly asymmetric pattern of
Complainant Success Rates requires an alternative, more robust,
systemic explanation.
D. Complainant Desire to Make Law
One could also suggest that Complainants’ preference for “rule
results” instead of “tangible results” explains the dearth in settlement
activity in WTO adjudication and therefore the persistent high
Complainant Success Rate. Marc Galanter was among the first to
analyze the outcomes of a case in terms of a rule component and a
tangible component. He proposed that a repeat litigant “interested in
maximizing his tangible gain in a series of cases . . . may be willing to
trade off tangible gain in any one case for rule gain (or to minimize

136.
Note that not all trade disputes are politically salient in terms of their
electoral implications. While the electoral dimensions of a case may discourage
settlement in some instances—e.g., US–Steel Safeguards—not all trade disputes have
significant electoral import. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R,
WT/DS249/AB/R,
WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R,
WT/DS253/AB/R,
WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003) (affirming the
Panel's finding that safeguard measures imposed by the United States “were deprived
of a legal basis,” and suggesting that the U.S. bring its safeguard measures into
conformity with its obligations under certain WTO agreement). That many WTO
disputes are not inherently political, but rather the product of interest-group rentseeking activity, is illustrated by cases such as EC—Bananas III and Brazil—
Retreaded Tires, where litigants could have settled without necessarily incurring any
tangible electoral loss. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tires, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007); Appellate Body Report, European
Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997). In sum, electoral politics does not influence settlement
behavior in all cases.
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rule loss).”137 By virtue of “experience and expertise,” Galanter
argues, a repeat litigant is willing to decline an immediate, albeit
fully satisfying settlement offer in favor of the opportunity to pursue
the long-term advantage that continuing with litigation might
bring.138 Because they expect to litigate again, such litigants are
motivated to “play for precedent” and thus seek to obtain a favorable
ruling that will have implications for future disputes.139 Since some
“WTO plaintiffs” have been repeat litigants, one must wonder if their
desire to make law has kept them away from settlements, which in
turn would explain Respondents’ inability to reduce their overall
losses by settling.
The notion that repeat Complainants have systematically
refrained from settling, thus rejecting tangible outcomes in favor of
proceeding with litigation aimed at creating precedent, lacks any
empirical support.
Unlike the prototypical repeat litigants in
Galanter’s study who tend to appear in one particular posture (i.e., as
defendants), WTO repeat Respondents also often appear as
Complainants. Remarkably, the “experience and expertise” gained
from being repeat litigants on one side fails to explain their very
disparate success rates.
For example, the U.S. appeared as
Complainant 29 times, with an 83% win rate, while it appeared as
Respondent 38 times, with an 82% loss rate. In the 25 instances in
which the EC appeared as Complainant, it won 96% of the time, but
lost in 88% of its 17 appearances as Respondent. Aside from being
nearly identical, these win–loss rates reveal that repeat litigants
have not been able to successfully implement a “play-for-precedent”
strategy, if they ever had one.140 Moreover, from a theoretical
perspective, Galanter’s argument is based on a dichotomy between
one-time and repeat litigants facing each other in litigation, with a
definite advantage accruing to the latter group due to experience and
expertise. As discussed earlier, this argument is premised on the
type of information and stake asymmetry that has not been detected
in this or other studies of WTO litigation.
Yet, the notion that Complainants have gained expertise from
engaging in litigation should not be discarded merely because they

137.
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 101 (1974).
138.
Id. at 103.
139.
For a discussion on the de facto precedential power of rulings in subsequent
WTO adjudication, see Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in
WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 151 (1999).
140.
In the 38 cases where the U.S. appeared as a Respondent, the EC was a
Complainant in 11 cases (29%). Conversely, in the 17 cases in which the EC was a
Respondent, the U.S. was a Complainant 6 times (35%). Thus, even if these members’
respective Respondent losses were fully attributable to litigating with the other repeat
litigant, these experts in WTO litigation should have still lost fewer cases as
Respondents.
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have been unable to replicate their success when appearing as
Respondents. In fact, they may have relied on such expertise to
decide not to bring more cases, as they realize that every win reduces
their discretion as sovereign states. They understand that a trade
liberalizing decision creates precedent that restrains the universe of
policy and regulatory choices they may adopt in the future.
Complainants realize that appearing before a court that is more than
willing to restrain members’ ability to regulate trade may give rise to
a “winner’s curse.”
In this sense, the asymmetric pattern of
Complainant wins, although an auspicious omen, may actually abate
their litigiousness.
E. Weakness of Respondents’ Cases
A final potential systemic explanation for high Complainant
Success Rates could be that Respondents have consistently failed to
present meritorious defenses. However, the notion that Respondents
have been consistently incorrect in their interpretation of WTO law
fails for several reasons. First, Respondents in one case often appear
as Complainants in other cases with unmatched success. That they
can successfully adjudicate as Complainants demonstrates that they
do understand and can apply the provisions covered by the same
agreements on which they tend to make losing arguments as
Respondents. Second, according to the positive theory of litigation,141
upon recognizing their early failures in WTO dispute settlement,
Respondents should have adjusted their litigation strategies by, for
example, settling more cases which would have improved their win
rate.142 However, as Figure A illustrates, Respondent win rates show
no signs of convergence with Complainant win rates. In fact, the
passage of time shows a growing divergence in litigants’ relative
success. After a brief early period (1996–1998)143 in which success
rates converged, Respondent and Complainant win rates increasingly
diverged with the passage of time.144

141.
See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 3, at 5 (suggesting that when gains or
losses from litigation are equal to both parties, there is a strong bias toward a rate of
success for plaintiffs at trial of 50% regardless of the substantive standard of law).
142.
As demonstrated earlier, WTO litigants have only opted for settlements
30% of the time. See supra Part IV.B. Moreover, as also demonstrated above,
settlement constraints are not to blame for the low utilization of settlements. Rather,
the low settlement rate must be attributed to WTO litigants’ choices.
143.
Although there were five panel requests in 1995, the DSB would only have
the opportunity to adopt reports in the following year since all panel decisions were
appealed. See DSU, supra note 7, art. 16(4) (implying that a panel report is appealed
before the DSB adoption).
144.
Of the thirteen cases decided in 1998, Complainants won eight cases (62%)
and Respondents won five (38%).
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However, even the early approximation in Respondent and
Complainant win rates appears to be more a result of how litigation
outcomes are tabulated than evidence of an actual convergence in
litigation outcomes. Figure B reports litigants’ success rates for all
cases based on the year in which the panel was requested. For
instance, among the five requests for a panel made in 1995,
Complainants eventually won four cases (80%) and Respondents won
only one (20%). Viewed in this way, the early 1995–1998 convergence
in litigant win rates was nothing more than one of three contrarian
fluctuations in an overall increasingly divergent trend.
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Yet, this lack of convergence in success rates conveys very little
about the quality of Respondents’ cases. It merely suggests the
possibility that Respondents have been myopic in their estimates of
success. That some defect in WTO Respondents’ litigation calculus
causes them to poorly forecast specific case outcomes does not imply
that their defenses have no merit.
Alternatively, it is possible that Respondents have gone forward
with litigation despite a strong likelihood of defeat, not because they
fail to see inherent weaknesses in their cases, but rather because they
strongly believe in the value of presenting their cases before a
seemingly unbiased adjudicator. The fact that the countries that are
most frequently Respondents are also among the most frequent
Complainants and are, therefore, very successful litigants, might
distort their perception of how the system actually operates.145 In the

145.
As discussed in Part IV, the U.S. has appeared as Complainant in 28% and
as Respondent in 36%, respectively, of all disputes. The EC has been the Respondent in
24% and the Complainant in 16%, respectively, of all disputes. As Third World
countries have done just as well as or even slightly better (in absolute terms) than their
First World counterparts, their perceptions as Complainants have likely influenced
their overall perception of the WTO dispute settlement system as well. Indeed,
Respondents, as most individuals, “tend to overestimate the frequency of
memorable . . . events” and they may persist in “incorrect judgments in the face of
inconsistent new information.” Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 694 n.217 (1987) (citation
omitted).
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absence of presenting systematically weak cases, Respondents’ faith
in the adjudicatory system, although contributing to their overall rate
of losses, is not the ultimate cause of their high loss rate, but the
unperceived bias of the adjudicatory system might be. In any case,
the fact that success rates show no significant correlation with
Complainant or Respondent identity or case attributes suggests that
a phenomenon other than case weakness or poorer lawyering is at
work. Thus, the possibility that Respondents’ faulty assessment of
the system in which they participate has contributed to a greater loss
rate does not negate the potential of biased rule development as a
systemic explanation.
VI. BIASED RULE DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO
The existence of a systematic, asymmetrical pattern of outcomes
in WTO dispute settlement has so far defied any robust empirical
explanation. Typical litigation-based variables and other systemic
explanations, such as case selection, settlement constraints,
information and stake asymmetries, Complainants’ desire to make
law, and the weakness of Respondents’ cases fail to account for the
sustained high Complainant Success Rates in WTO adjudication. It
is only logical to ponder whether these systematic asymmetrical
findings are the result of a process of authoritative normative
evolution (i.e., rule development) that has expressed itself with a tilt
favoring Complainants—hence the term “biased rule development.”
In general, adjudication is a mode of interaction that, at least in
form, is largely egalitarian. As in other adjudicatory contexts, WTO
litigants are equal before the law and play by rules of engagement
that “do not permit them to deploy all their resources in the conflict,
but require that they proceed within the limiting forms” of WTO
dispute settlement.146 In such disputes, the applicable law can be
any one or several of the negotiated agreements dealing with diverse
aspects of international trade. Of course, one would not expect WTO
rule development to be isolated from the influence of external
intellectual currents or from “the preferences and prudences of the
decision-makers.”147 Clearly, the agreements will be articulated by a
set of individuals who are not operating in an intellectual vacuum.
Still, specific and purposeful distinctions among the agreements, such
as differing standards of review, should be reflected in the decisions

146.
Galanter, supra note 137, at 135; see also DSU, supra note 7, art.1; JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109 (2d ed. 1997) (contrasting settlement by
negotiation and agreement with reference (explicitly or implicitly) to relative power
status of the parties with settlement by negotiation or decision with reference to norms
or rules both parties have previously agreed).
147.
Galanter, supra note 137, at 103.
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issued by the adjudicating authorities and in the overall pattern of
outcomes. To date, the uniform pattern of complainant success,
regardless of the agreement underlying the dispute, indicates that
WTO adjudication fails to map out these distinctions.
This
distinction and WTO adjudicators’ adoption of other pro-Complainant
decisional patterns are the most robust explanation for the
asymmetric nature of WTO adjudication.
A. Biased Ruled Development in the Application of the
AD Standard of Review
The high rate of Complainant success in one type of dispute
under an agreement with a more Respondent-deferential standard of
review—the AD Agreement—could result from Respondents’
systematically poor defenses on the merits. In this manner, a more
deferential standard of review cannot by itself produce the expected
higher rate of Respondent success in the presence of the most
egregious violations of an agreement. However, there is no evidence
that confirms the occurrence in AD disputes of systematically weaker
defenses or more egregious violations than in disputes arising under
other agreements. On the contrary, a look at the early years of WTO
dispute settlement (January 1995–September 2002), with a specific
focus on WTO decisions in AD cases, actually reveals that the lowerthan-expected rate of Respondent success was less related to the
relative strengths of the litigants’ cases than to the adjudicators’
dilution of the AD Agreement’s standard of review. In light of the
general consensus that WTO adjudicators view prior decisions as
having at least some precedential value, I focused on early WTO
decisions concerning AD cases.148 If this consensus is correct, these
cases have significant future import and thus provide an ideal
window into the nature of WTO dispute settlement.
There were a total of ten adjudications involving disputes under
the AD Agreement during this period.149 The standard of review of

148.
See, e.g., Bhala, supra note 139, at 151 (observing de facto precedent on
procedural and substantive issues).
149.
Panel Report, Egypt—Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar
from Turkey, WT/DS211/R (Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Egypt—Steel Rebar]; Panel
Report, United States—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate
from India, WT/DS206/R (June 28, 2002); Appellate Body Report, United States—
Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan,
WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001) [hereinafter US—Steel Products]; Appellate Body
Report, Thailand—Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron of
Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001); Appellate
Body Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type
Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001); Panel Report, United States—
Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and
Strip from Korea, WT/DS179/R (Dec. 22, 2000); Panel Report, Guatemala—Definitive
Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS156/R (Oct. 24,
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national authorities’ legal interpretations is expressly set forth within
the Agreement:
[T]he panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of
the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the
panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the
Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.150

A similarly deferential standard applies to Respondents’ factual
determinations. Indeed, so long as Respondent authorities’ factual
evaluations are “unbiased and objective,” the panel should not
overturn them “even though the panel might have reached a different
conclusion.”151 Despite its sui generis status as the only standard of
review explicitly developed for a particular type of WTO dispute, and
notwithstanding its heightened deference to Respondents’
authorities, the Article 17.6(ii) standard did not lead to any proRespondent jurisprudence in the earlier years of WTO dispute
settlement. Respondents lost every single case. In fact, as Tarullo
observed, “It is difficult to identify any issue in any of the cases in
which this special standard has produced an outcome different from
that which would have prevailed had there been no Article 17.6.”152
1.

Nullification of the AD Standard by Capriciously Interpreting Its
Terms

The Appellate Body most thoroughly articulated its views on the
application of the Article 17.6(ii) standard in US–Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US–Steel
Products).153
In the course of an AD investigation, the U.S.
Department of Commerce (Commerce), pursuant to its regulations,154
rejected information from two Japanese companies because they had
failed to submit such information within the required deadline (87

2000); Panel Report, Mexico—Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R (Jan. 28, 2000); Panel Report, United
States—Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors
(DRAMS) of One Megabit of Above from Korea, WT/DS99/R (Jan. 29, 1999); Appellate
Body Report, Guatemala—Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement
from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Guatemala—Cement].
150.
Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 25, art. 17(6)(ii).
151.
Id. art. 17(6)(i).
152.
Tarullo, supra note 37, at 118; accord MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 393 (2d ed. 2006) (“[W]e
have yet to see a case in which the choice of a standard of review had an impact on the
outcome of a dispute.”).
153.
Tarullo, supra note 37, at 118.
154.
See Customs Duties, 19 C.F.R. § 351.301 (2008).
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days).155 In its WTO challenge, Japan argued that the U.S. agency
could not reject this information solely because it was submitted after
the agency’s established deadline.156 The panel found that Commerce
had not acted in conformity with AD Article 6.8, which requires
interested parties to “provide[] necessary information within a
reasonable period” and allows the investigating authority to proceed
with the investigation on a “facts available” basis. The panel first
explained that “a ‘reasonable period’ will not in all instances be
commensurate with pre-established deadlines set out in general
regulations.”157 Using this flexible definition, the panel concluded
that Commerce’s refusal of a submission that “could have been
verified and used, but was instead rejected as untimely,” was not
consistent with Article 6.8, since “an unbiased and objective
investigating authority evaluating that evidence could not have
reached the conclusion that [the Japanese companies] had failed to
provide necessary information within a reasonable period.”158
On appeal, the U.S. argued that Commerce’s pre-established
deadlines for data submission were “reasonable” and constituted “a
permissible interpretation” of Article 6.8.159 Using the language of
Article 17.6(i), the U.S. maintained that “even if the panel might have
reached a different conclusion,” that conclusion should not displace
an objective and unbiased decision by the domestic agency to reject
the evidence as submitted.160 Remarkably, the Appellate Body
focused its analysis solely on the “objective and unbiased” portion of
the Article 17.6(i) standard and never addressed the “permissible
interpretation” argument put forth by the U.S.161 The Appellate
Body held that the panel had been correct in ruling that Commerce
had failed the “objective and unbiased” portion of the test by not
concluding that the Japanese companies had provided the necessary
information within a “reasonable period.”162 To determine what
constitutes a reasonable period, the Appellate Body developed a list of
six factors that antidumping authorities should consider as they
analyze “the particular circumstances of each case.”163 Because
Commerce failed to conduct a “reasonableness analysis” similar to
that proposed by the Appellate Body, the Appellate Body found its

155.
See US—Steel Products, supra note 149, ¶ 10 (discussing the assertion of
the United States that deadlines were reasonable).
156.
Id. ¶ 18.
157.
Panel Report, United States—Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan, ¶ 7.54, WT/DS184/R (Feb. 28, 2001).
158.
Id. ¶¶ 7.55, 7.57.
159.
US—Steel Products, supra note 149, ¶¶ 9–10.
160.
Id. ¶ 11.
161.
Id. ¶¶ 55–56.
162.
Id. ¶¶ 87–90.
163.
Id. ¶ 85.
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action did “not rest upon a permissible interpretation of Article 6.8 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement.”164
While a reference to the “permissible interpretation” language of
Article 17.6(ii) might create the illusion that the Appellate Body was
in fact applying the standard as it construed the term “reasonable,”
the Appellate Body actually nullified it by creating a new, noncontemporaneous test. In basing its decision solely on its newly
constructed reasonableness test, the Appellate Body failed to consider
that Commerce’s interpretation might fall squarely within the
ordinary meaning of the term.165 In any litigation system in the
world, tardy submissions are per se impermissible. Indeed, the
conclusion that “an administrative agency may never ‘reasonably’
adhere strictly to the letter of limits it may establish for the
submission of information by interested parties, even if those limits
are themselves generous” is “inconsistent with much administrative
and judicial practice.”166 In fact, paragraph 3 of Annex II of the
Agreement—referenced by Article 6.8—incorporates the ordinary
meaning of reasonableness by explicitly referring to “verifiable
information” as information submitted “in a timely fashion.”167 More
importantly, the AD Agreement itself adheres to the general
presumption of reasonableness of national authorities’ regulations by
directing WTO adjudicators to “examine the matter based upon . . .
facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic
procedures to the authorities of the importing Member.”168 That the
Appellate Body could find a generally accepted practice unreasonable
while extolling the flexibility of the very term “reasonableness”
demonstrates its willingness to disregard the mandated standard and
engage in sophistry.
2.

Application of a Non-Deferential Standard Where the AD
Standard Controls

A more troubling aspect of the Appellate Body’s pro-Complainant
interpretation of the AD Agreement, however, has been the
systematic erosion of the Article 17.6(ii) deferential standard. In nonAD disputes, the Appellate Body has recognized that Article 17.6

164.
Id. ¶ 89 (italics in original).
165.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
166.
Tarullo, supra note 37, at 124.
167.
Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 25, Annex II, ¶ 3 (“All information
which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can be used in the
investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely fashion . . .
should be taken into account when determinations are made.” (emphasis added)).
168.
Id. art. 17.5(ii).
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“sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that
Agreement,”169 and acknowledged that no agreement but the AntiDumping Agreement “prescrib[es] a particular standard of review.”170
In fact, the Appellate Body has stated that applying the AD standard
in the context of a dispute arising under the SPS Agreement would
alter a “finely drawn balance” between “the jurisdictional
competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the
jurisdictional competences retained by the Members for
Despite the avowed respect for the Members’
themselves.”171
retained competencies and the recognition of the AD Agreement’s
special standard, the Appellate Body has not applied the more
deferential review required in actual AD disputes.172
In its initial decisions involving the AD Agreement, the panels
and the Appellate Body either made token references to or articulated
views that diluted the impact of the Article 17.6 standard. In fact, in
its first AD decision, the Appellate Body held that the AD and the
DSU standards “complement[ ] each other.”173 The Appellate Body
explained that the DSU standard also governs the analysis in AD
cases unless adherence to the DSU standard leads to a “conflict”
between the provisions of the DSU and the AD Agreement.174 Thus,
rather than controlling in every AD dispute, the Article 17.6 standard
is construed as serving an auxiliary role to the less deferential DSU
standard, and, therefore, only governs review of AD decisions in
situations where the adjudicator would reach conflicting decisions
under the two standards.175 Yet, the ordinary meaning of the DSU
provision quoted by the Appellate Body does not support this
interpretation. Specifically, DSU Article 1.2 provides that “[t]o the
extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of
this Understanding . . . the special or additional rules and procedures
in Appendix 2 shall prevail.”176 Appendix 2 lists AD Agreement
Article 17.6 as one such special rule.177 Since the DSU expressly
recognizes a difference between the AD Agreement standard and its
own general standard and requires application of the “special or
additional rule” as the rule that “shall prevail,”178 one wonders why

169.
US—Leaded Bar, supra note 113, ¶ 47.
170.
EC—Beef Hormones, supra note 36, ¶ 114.
171.
Id. ¶ 115.
172.
DSU Article 11 provides the standard of review otherwise applicable to
disputes arising under the other agreements. DSU, supra note 7, art. 11. Under this
standard, a panel is required to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it,”
and is not bound to extend the greater deference afforded under the AD Standard. Id.
173.
Guatemala—Cement, supra note 149, ¶ 65.
174.
Id.
175.
Id. ¶ 66.
176.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 1(2) (emphasis added).
177.
Id. app. 2.
178.
Id. art. 1.2.
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the Appellate Body interposed the occurrence of a conflict as the
requirement for exclusive application of the AD standard. The plain
language of DSU Article 1.2 requires the adjudicator to apply the AD
standard as the controlling authority; the DSU standard does not
apply. By interjecting the requirement of a conflict between the two
standards, the Appellate Body not only contradicted the letter of the
DSU, but also diluted the impact of the AD standard.
3.

Conflation of the AD Standard with the DSU Standard

The WTO adjudicators’ tendency to interpret WTO law in a way
that dilutes the AD standard has also manifested itself in their
conflation of Article 17.6(i)’s call to “determine whether the
authorities’ . . . evaluation [of the facts] was unbiased and
objective”179 with the DSU Article 11 requirement to “make an
objective assessment.”180 In applying DSU Article 11’s “objective
assessment” simultaneously with the Article 17.6(i) standard, the
panel in Egypt–Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar
from Turkey (Egypt–Steel Rebar) suggested that agencies’ factual
determinations are subject to a more intrusive review than the
Article 17.6(i) standard seems to authorize.181 Early in its report, the
panel stated that fact-finding is “‘always constrained by the mandate
of Article 11 of the DSU.’”182 Also, despite recognizing that “we
should not involve ourselves in a de novo review of the facts,” the
panel “deem[ed] it necessary to undertake a detailed review of the
evidence submitted [to the agency].”183 The panel’s detailed review of
the evidence involved a thorough examination of the administrative
record, including an extensive analysis of the responses submitted by
each investigated company and the agency’s reactions to these
responses.184 Thus, the panel reviewed the evidence as if DSU Article
11 controlled.
By applying the DSU standard where it cannot apply,185 the
Egypt–Steel Rebar panel conflated the two standards and minimized
all distinctions between them. Moreover, the panel’s analysis under
the DSU standard approaches, and is perhaps identical to, the de
novo standard of review it recognized as improper under Article
17.6(i). More importantly, this approach effectively eliminates the
possibility of considering antidumping authorities’ factual

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 25, art. 17.6(i).
DSU, supra note 7, art. 11.
Egypt—Steel Rebar, supra note 149, ¶¶ 7.9, 7.14.
Id. ¶ 7.11.
Id. ¶ 7.14 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶¶ 7.165–.266.
See DSU, supra note 7, art. 1.2, app. 2.
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determinations under the more deferential purview of the AD
Agreement.186
As exemplified in each of these cases, whether through specious
definitions of terms contained in the AD Agreement’s factual and
legal standards, through the creation of artificial and unwarranted
tests, or through the conflation of the DSU and AD standards, WTO
adjudicators have severely diminished the level of deference owed to
Respondents’ agencies under the AD Agreement as negotiated by
WTO members. This systematic erosion of the AD standards
illustrates a pattern of rule development that not only constitutes
what several scholars have characterized as “judicial activism,”187 but
also exhibits a pro-Complainant bias. The existence of a Respondentdeferential standard and the absence of any evidence indicating that
Respondents engage in more egregious violations of the AD
Agreement than other WTO agreements suggest that the high rate of
Complainant success (and Respondent loss) in AD litigation follows
from the evisceration of the standard. This bias explains the high
rate of Complainant success.
This normative evolution of rules with a systematic proComplainant bias would have a limited explanatory scope if it were
restricted to the particular context of AD adjudication. However,
because activist adjudicators are not likely to restrict their activism
to a particular area of the law, one would expect biased rule
development to transcend case categories and thus serve as an
explanation for the generally asymmetric nature of WTO outcomes.
The following subpart presents a set of cases that illustrate a pattern
of biased rule development occurring outside the context of AD
disputes.
B. Biased Rule Development in the Inconsistent Use of Declarations
The Appellate Body’s use of declarations contained in WTO
documents and in other international treaties illustrates yet another
method of developing WTO law in Complainants’ favor.
The
Appellate Body has been inconsistent in interpreting and giving effect
to declarations, or general proclamations made by parties in
connection with an agreement but not contained within the statutory
terms of the agreement itself. This lack of general coherence also

186.
That the panel upheld most of the agency’s findings in this dispute does not
diminish the point that the panel, relying on Appellate Body precedent, had engaged in
the kind of intrusive review that defies the level of deference mandated by the Article
17.6(i) standard.
187.
Ragosta et al., supra note 17, at 748–50; see also CLAUDE E. BARFIELD,
FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WTO 42 (2001)
(stating that the Appellate Body is legislating instead of interpreting the law);
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 152, at 130 (referring to more recent cases).
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coincides with the Complainant–Respondent divide in that the legal
significance given to declarations in a particular case seems to
correlate with the interests of the Complainants. The following cases
illustrate that the Appellate Body’s inconsistent treatment of
declarations has restricted Respondents’ discretion beyond the
domain of AD law.
1.

Interpretation of “Pro-Respondent” Declarations as Merely
Hortatory

In United States–Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in
the United Kingdom (US–Leaded Bar), the Respondent argued that
the AD Agreement’s standard of review applied to WTO analysis of
countervailing duty measures covered by the SCM Agreement.
Despite recognizing that the SCM Agreement contains no specific
standard of review, the U.S. availed itself of a Ministerial Declaration
that seemingly communicated the ministers’ intent to extend the AD
Agreement’s standard of review to disputes arising under the SCM
Agreement.188 Specifically, the Declaration provides that the
Ministers recognize, with respect to dispute settlement pursuant to the
[AD] Agreement . . . or . . . the [SCM] Agreement . . . the need for the
consistent resolution of disputes arising from anti-dumping and
countervailing duty measures.189

The U.S. argued that the declaration not only expressed the
“clear intent of the Ministers to apply the [AD] standard of review” to
subsidy disputes, but also "create[d] binding obligations.”190 Thus,
according to the U.S., the panel “erred in applying the [DSU]
standard . . . rather than the standard . . . set forth in [the AD]
Agreement.”191 Finding that the SCM Agreement “does not contain
any ‘special or additional rules’ on the standard of review to be
applied,”192 the Appellate Body ruled that the declaration could not
“impose an obligation to apply” the AD standard of review.193 Rather,
the declaration contained “hortatory language,” exemplified by the
use of the term “recognize,” which, in the Appellate Body’s view, was
not a command, but “merely acknowledge[d] ‘the need for the

188.
US—Leaded Bar, supra note 113, ¶¶ 45, 48.
189.
World Trade Organization, Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to
the Agreement on Implementation of VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
LT/UR/DEC-2/1 (1994) [hereinafter AD Ministerial Declaration].
190.
US—Leaded Bar, supra note 113, ¶ 10.
191.
Id. ¶ 44.
192.
Id. ¶ 45.
193.
Id. ¶ 49.
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consistent resolution of [AD and CVD] disputes.”194 This language
seems to indicate that, as far as declarations are concerned, the
Appellate Body adhered to a strict constructionist approach. They
also signal that the Appellate Body construed declarations couched in
similar words as no more than aspirational. Perhaps this explains
why the Appellate Body did not articulate how not applying the same
standards of review to the two types of disputes would lead to their
“consistent resolution,” a goal that the declaration “merely
acknowledge[d].” Thus, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s
application of the less Respondent-deferential DSU standard.
However, when it had previously considered “hortatory”
language contained in another WTO document and in a set of nonWTO international agreements, the Appellate Body reached beyond
their aspirational content, choosing to give similarly worded
declarations binding effect.
In doing so, the Appellate Body
effectively limited the scope of Respondent’s regulatory conduct,
which it viewed as impermissibly restricting trade.
2.

Interpretation of “Pro-Complainant” Declarations as More than
Hortatory

In United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (US–Shrimp/Turtle), the Appellate Body struck
down U.S. legislation designed to limit the incidental taking of sea
turtles in the process of shrimp harvesting, finding that it violated
GATT Article XX’s criteria against arbitrary and unjustified
discrimination.195 U.S. regulations had banned the import of shrimp
from countries that failed to show “a credible enforcement record” of
the use of turtle-excluder devices (TEDs) similar to that imposed on
the U.S. domestic shrimp industry.196 While never disputing that its
import ban was a violation of GATT Article XI’s prohibition of
quantitative restrictions, the U.S. argued that these measures
intended to promote the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource and, as such, were excepted under GATT Article XX(g).197
The Appellate Body agreed that the challenged measures were
indeed within the exception198 but found them impermissible because
they had been implemented “in a manner which constituted arbitrary
and unjustifiable discrimination between Members of the WTO,
contrary to the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.”199
Specifically, the Appellate Body faulted the U.S. for securing

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. (quoting AD Ministerial Declaration, supra note 189).
US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 186.
See id. ¶ 162.
See id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 145.
Id. ¶ 186.
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agreements with some but not all shrimp-exporting members, which
resulted in their differential and thus “discriminatory” treatment.200
Despite U.S. protests that “it had offered to negotiate but
Complainants [India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand] did not
reply,”201 the Appellate Body, following the panel below, “did not find
it necessary to examine whether [the U.S. and the Complaining]
parties entered into negotiations in good faith.”202 Rather, the
Appellate Body relied heavily on the notion that the U.S. was
obligated to engage in “serious, across-the-board negotiations with
the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements . . .
before enforcing the import prohibition.”203 The Appellate Body based
this obligation on the “need” for “concerted and cooperative efforts,”
which had been recognized in prior WTO declarations and other
international instruments regarding the environment.204
Yet, not unlike the declaration referenced in US–Leaded Bar,
these declarations were couched in otherwise “hortatory” language.205
For instance, the preamble of the Agreement Establishing the WTO
(WTO Agreement), which the Appellate Body quoted, states:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living . . . while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both
to protect and preserve the environment . . . .
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated . . . multilateral trading
system . . . .206

200.
Id. ¶ 167.
201.
Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, § VII(E)(2), ¶ 7.54, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter US—
Shrimp Turtle Panel Report].
202.
US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 166 (quoting the US—Shrimp Turtle
Panel Report, supra note 201, ¶ 7.56).
203.
US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 166 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Appellate Body attached great significance to the fact that the creation of the
regulatory scheme preceded the unsuccessful attempts by the U.S. to enter into an
agreement with the Complainants. While the perception of U.S. unilateralism may
have contributed to the lack of success in convincing the Complainants to enter an
agreement, the preexistence of the TED requirement by itself hardly constitutes
evidence that the U.S. had not tried to negotiate in good faith with the Complainants.
In fact, the Appellate Body itself recognized that the U.S. had entered into the 1996
Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. See id.
¶ 171. Remarkably, however, the Appellate Body construed such success against the
Respondent, indicating that the existence of the Convention “provide[d] convincing
demonstration that an alternative course of action was reasonably open to the USA.”
Id.
204.
Id. ¶ 168.
205.
US—Leaded Bar, supra note 113, ¶ 49.
206.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl.,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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To the Appellate Body, this preambular language “reflect[ed] the
intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement,” and thus “must add
color, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements
annexed to the WTO Agreement.”207 The interpretation the Appellate
Body eventually gave to the chapeau of Article XX imposed on
members an obligation to exhaust multilateral avenues before
enacting a conservation scheme that might present obstacles to trade.
That obligation, however, is found nowhere in the WTO agreements.
A member is entitled to avail itself of any of the enumerated
exceptions under Article XX and does not necessarily engage in
arbitrary or discriminatory conduct when it pursues a regulatory
course that precedes negotiation of a multilateral agreement.208 In
fact, Article XX owes its existence to members’ desire to retain such
jurisdictional competencies by reserving themselves the right to
deviate from WTO general principles under particular circumstances.
Although vowing to “protect and preserve the environment” in
prefatory language,209 members did not enter into any express or
implicit obligation to proceed multilaterally as a matter of WTO law.
In fairness, the Appellate Body did not rely solely on this
prefatory language but on a growing number of international legal
instruments that together express the growing consensus for
multilateral action. Indeed, the Appellate Body quoted four other
non-WTO declarations: the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles (Inter-American Convention), the
Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.210 Despite
references in some of these treaties to members’ obligations under
different WTO Agreements,211 none of these treaties create binding
obligations as a matter of WTO law. As Article 1.1 of the DSU
provides, the rules and procedures of the DSU, the WTO Agreement,
and the other covered agreements are the law that WTO adjudicators
“shall apply to [WTO] disputes.”212 No express or implicit provision
in these WTO agreements authorizes resort to substantive public
international law. In fact, the call of DSU Article 3.2 for WTO
adjudicators “to clarify the existing provisions of [the] agreements”

207.
US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 153. The Appellate Body also
referred to language in the Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment, which
“endorsed and supported . . . ‘multilateral solutions based on international cooperation
and consensus as the best and most effective way for governments to tackle
environmental problems of a transboundary or global nature.’” Id. ¶ 168.
208.
GATT, supra note 7, art. XX(d).
209.
WTO Agreement, supra note 206, pmbl.
210.
US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 130, 168–70.
211.
Id. ¶ 169 (quoting Inter-American Convention on the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles art. XV, Dec. 1, 1996, 37 I.L.M. 1246).
212.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 1(1).
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expressly circumscribes hermeneutic activity to “customary rules of
interpretation of public international law,” not in any way endorsing
the application of substantive provisions of non-WTO international
law.213 That the Vienna Convention calls for the consideration of
non-WTO international norms in the interpretation of ambiguous
WTO terms does not amount to an authorization to construe those
extrinsic norms as giving rise to WTO obligations in and of
themselves.214
Although there is much to be said for the need for
multilateralism in environmental conservation as well as other
transnational issues, none of the declarations or binding
commitments contained in these non-WTO agreements should have
been used by the Appellate Body to “mark[] out the equilibrium line”
In doing so, the
between members rights and obligations.215
Appellate Body used the words of these non-WTO authorities to
impute to the chapeau of Article XX concepts that were not intended.
In fact, the Appellate Body gave these non-WTO substantive
instruments binding effect, as confirmed by the Appellate Body’s
language in the subsequent compliance case brought by Malaysia.216
In concluding that the Respondent had complied with its ruling in the
underlying dispute, the Appellate Body explained:
[G]iven the decided preference for multilateral approaches voiced by
WTO Members and others in the international community in various
international agreements for the protection and conservation of
endangered sea turtles that were cited in our previous Report, the
United States, in our view, would be expected to make good faith efforts
to reach international agreements that are comparable from one form of
negotiation to the other.217

Thus, the Appellate Body, in its own words, used non-WTO
substantive law to craft and enforce an entirely new obligation on a
Respondent.218

213.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 3(2) (emphasis added).
214.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 165, art. 31(3)(c) (“There shall be taken
into account, together with the context . . . any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties.”).
215.
See US—Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 91, ¶ 170.
216.
US—Shrimp/Turtle Compliance, supra note 113 (explaining the Appellate
Body’s review of Malaysia’s complaint that United States failed to make good-faith
efforts to negotiate with it before banning the importation of certain shrimp from
Malaysia).
217.
Id. ¶ 122 (emphasis added).
218.
For a similar endorsement of giving binding effect to substantive public
international law in WTO disputes, see Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting
Government Procurement, ¶ 7.96, WT/DS163/R (June 19, 2000), in which the Panel
states that:
Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations
between the WTO Members. Such international law applies . . . to the extent
there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered WTO
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As far as this analysis of WTO rule development is concerned,
the unauthorized resort to substantive public international law, while
troubling, is not the most revealing aspect of US–Shrimp/Turtle.
Rather, the use of declarations expressed in WTO documents is the
better illustration of the Appellate Body’s tendency to evolve WTO
law to the detriment of Respondents. That the Appellate Body could
construe one declaration—the preambular declaration—as creating
an obligation upon members and interpret similar language in
another—the standard-of-review declaration—as no more than an
aspiration, demonstrates an inconsistent attitude not found in
unbiased adjudicators. To detect this inconsistency, one need neither
disagree with the Appellate Body’s ruling that the U.S. afforded
differential and, thus, discriminatory treatment to the Complainants
in this case, nor with the Appellate Body’s ruling in US–Leaded
Bar.219 One need only observe the different reading the Appellate
Body gave to declarations in US–Shrimp/Turtle and, later, in US–
Leaded Bar. Both declarations express the intent of the same
negotiators, during the same round of negotiations, with similar
language.
In US–Shrimp/Turtle, however, the pertinent
declarations, which favored Complainants, were given binding effect.
C. Biased Rule Development: From Localized Patterns to an AllEncompassing Activist Jurisprudence
The cases discussed in Parts VI.A and VI.B show how WTO
adjudicators have consistently deployed interpretive methods that
produce a consistent outcome: restricting Respondent discretion to
adopt otherwise trade-restrictive measures, and thus furthering the
promotion of an unfettered version of trade. While free trade itself is
the noble goal on which the entire WTO edifice is erected—a goal that
is not controverted by this Article—its pursuit is disciplined by a set
of agreements that demarcate what constitutes permissible conduct
under a self-contained system of laws. As described above and as the
overall asymmetric pattern of Complainant and Respondent Success
Rates suggests, WTO litigators have adopted a pro-trade adjudicatory
agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the customary rules
of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty
formation under the WTO.
Id.
219.
Indeed, the holding of the case—that measures prohibiting the importation
of shrimp harvested by methods that kill sea turtles qualify as WTO-compliant, even
when discriminatory, so long as they are not applied in an arbitrary and unjustified
manner—could hardly be interpreted as anti-Respondent. Rather, what seems
problematic is the Appellate Body’s finding that Respondent’s application of the TED
measures constituted arbitrary and unjustified discrimination due to Respondent’s
“failure” to negotiate a multilateral agreement that included the Complainants on the
assumption that Respondent was so obligated on the basis of declaratory language.
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philosophy that sacrifices Respondents’ jurisdictional competencies.
This adjudicatory philosophy has manifested itself in two major types
of case dispositions: reducing Respondents’ rights under the
agreements (e.g., nullifying the Respondent-deferential AD standard
by capriciously interpreting its terms, applying the DSU standard
where the more deferential AD standard controls, conflating the two
standards into an amorphous de novo standard, and giving no effect
to declarations that would presumably favor Respondents) and
creating Respondent obligations where none previously existed (e.g.,
creating extraneous, non-contemporaneous tests to gauge
Respondents’ conduct during investigations, finding an obligation to
engage in multilateral negotiations before instituting regulations,
and using non-WTO obligations to test a Respondent’s good faith). As
the Appellate Body has acted in a manner that consistently reduces
Respondents’ regulatory discretion, it has produced a jurisprudence
that privileges trade liberalization at the expense of the reservations
members made through the negotiating process. By producing a
jurisprudence that “clarif[ies] the existing provisions of [the]
agreements” consistently in one direction, WTO adjudicators have
failed to “preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements.”220
However, in describing the task of clarifying the provisions of the
WTO agreements, trade scholars have often used neutral terms to
characterize this process, such as filling in gaps,221 “completing the
analysis,”222 or “clarifying ambiguity,”223 which describe the
otherwise normal and uncontroversial operation of impartial
adjudicators in applying abstract norms to concrete cases. Use of
these neutral terms might be justified because most analyses focus on
a limited number of disputes, a method that does not permit the
detection of broader, case-transcending trends that reveal the

220.
See DSU, supra note 7, art. 3(2).
221.
Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623,
638 (2006) (explaining that WTO adjudicators are required to fill in gaps in cases
involving matters either unconsidered or unresolved by negotiators and stating that
the Appellate Body “has been prudent and has avoided extensive ‘judicial legislation’”);
see also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”:
Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 617 (2002) (stating that Appellate Body was at
times “confronted with a ‘gap,’ i.e., an issue apparently not addressed by the covered
agreement, but which [has] to be decided nevertheless”).
222.
Robert Howse, The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body
Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the Judicial Power, in THE ROLE OF THE
JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, 11, 17 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C.
Mavroidis eds., 2003) (quoting the Appellate Body in Appellate Body Report, United
States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr.
29, 1996)).
223.
Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 252 (2004).
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systematic pro-Complainant nature of this jurisprudence. Still, these
scholars raise cautionary notes about the Appellate Body’s authority
to craft principles of WTO law. For instance, while Deborah Cass
argues that WTO adjudicators are generating a body of law perhaps
best understood through a constitutional lens, she cautions that “the
international trade ‘constitutionalization project’ should take more
seriously the powerful and insistent claims of legitimacy, democracy
(of both substance and form) and community.”224
Indeed, many international trade law scholars have addressed
the inherent dangers of using a judicial process to generate new rules
and procedures,225 especially because this adjudicative activity
Giving broad
generates ex post facto rules and standards.226
interpretive—and even legislative—authority to the WTO’s dispute
settlement system transfers decisional power to a select few WTO
panelists and Appellate Body members, when it is clear that the
intention of the WTO members was to reserve the power to adopt new
binding interpretations to the Ministerial Conference and to make
new law only via the treaty amendment process.227 The creation of
an ambitious body of law teleologically bound to an activist, liberal
view of trade that reaches beyond the set of negotiated bargains
significantly strains the considered original will of the WTO
members. In the absence of institutions that can both serve as a
check on judicial lawmaking and “be accountable for the policy and
value tradeoffs” involved in making teleological choices, WTO

224.
DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADING SYSTEM 246 (2005); see also Deborah Z. Cass, The “Constitutionalization” of
International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional
Development in International Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L 39, 72 (2001)
(“[C]onstitutionalalization practice described here . . . contains within some difficult
debates about trade liberalization and globalization, and legitimacy, democracy and
international order, about how legal systems are made, and by whom.”).
225.
See Armin von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO—Strategies to Cope
with a Deficient Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 609, 611 (2001) (arguing that
there is a deficient relationship between the political and adjudicative functions of the
WTO); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s “Constitution” and the
Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 664 (2006) (“The paradox is
that constitutionalism . . . cannot possibly deliver the escape from politics that it
promises.”); Rahul Singh, The World Trade Organization and Legitimacy: Evolving a
Framework for Bridging the Democratic Deficit, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 347, 352–54 (2008)
(testing the legitimacy of the WTO’s law making apparatus); Trachtman, supra note
221, at 637 (“These types of quasi-legislation, delegated by the WTO to these other
bodies, present important questions about democratic accountability.”).
226.
Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 412
(2000).
227.
See WTO Agreement, supra note 206, art. IX(2), X (“Ministerial Conference
and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of
this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.”); see also von Bogdandy,
supra note 225, at 628 (“Article X:8 WTO provides the competence for autonomous
rulemaking with regard to the dispute settlement procedures.”).
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adjudicators should exercise judicial restraint.228 Simply put, there is
no WTO demos or democratic community whose will WTO
However laudable the
adjudicators can validly express.229
development of a jurisprudence that embraces predictability through
judicial lawmaking may be, the creation of nonnegotiated obligations
under the guise of interpreting negotiated agreements is antithetical
to the basic principle that what sovereign states have not specifically
promised to do cannot be legally required of them.230
Granted, the adoption of a philosophically more modest
jurisprudence that is cognizant of the value of domestic regulations in
a multilateral trade regime but that still permits a great deal of
regulatory diversity involves striking a difficult balance. In their
quest to create a unifying trade regime, members recognized the
value in experimenting with alternative rules suited to their
individual needs, even at the cost of sacrificing trade.
This
recognition is evident, for instance, in the subject-matter exceptions
of GATT Article XX. Though tempered by restrictions against
arbitrary enforcement, these exceptions exist to protect the
regulatory diversity that itself mirrors “the values and norms that
shape” members’ different societies.231 Thus, more sensitivity to
Respondents’ sovereign rights, as the Appellate Body demonstrated in
the early EC–Beef Hormones case, need not be equated with total
deference, as the result of the case suggests.232 However, if such
sensitivity were extended throughout the domain of WTO litigation, it
is unlikely that the balance of outcomes would be so one-sided.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problem that activism poses is not merely one of lack of
democratic checks, which is itself a very serious problem, but the fact
that such activism is occurring within the domain of a rules-based
system. A rules-based system is antithetical to activism, especially
one that creates consistently one-sided jurisprudence by eroding

228.
Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy through “Higher Law”?
Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 307, 309 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis
eds., 2003).
229.
See id. at 329 (making a similar point regarding the European Parliament).
230.
See The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10
(Sept. 7) (allowing Turkish jurisdiction over a French defendant as long as does not
conflict with international law when the act occurred abroad but had effects in Turkey).
231.
Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations, in GLOBALIZATION: WHAT’S NEW?
196, 199 (Michael M. Weinstein ed. 2005).
232.
EC—Beef Hormones, supra note 36, ¶ 246 (invalidating a trade ban on
hormone-fed beef, but stating that a ban based on scientific evidence, after scientific
risk assessment, would be upheld even if the standard applied were more stringent
than international standards).
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Respondents’ rights and increasing Respondents’ obligations. The
argument that WTO adjudicators have embarked on a project to curb
national authorities’ power to engage in actions inconsistent with a
liberal view of international trade involves more than a debate on the
merits of comparative advantage.
Determining whether this
adjudicatory mechanism does what it is legally required to do is
critical to the preservation of a system founded on negotiated rules.
While the perception that the WTO system is operating under a
single coherent philosophical force is widely discussed in current
WTO literature, until this study there had been no demonstration of
just how far-reaching an asymmetric pattern of decision making has
materialized in the collective repertoire of WTO decisions. The
existence of a sustained pattern of Complainant success, with win
rates ranging from 83% to 91% across Case Types, constitutes a
substantial deviation from the 50% success rate predicted under
random litigation assumptions. This systematic outcome asymmetry
defied several alternative explanations, such as case selection,
settlement constraints, information and stake asymmetries,
Complainants’ desire to make law, and supposed weakness in
Respondents’ cases.
Rather, the outcome asymmetry is more
parsimoniously explained by a normative evolution that consistently
construes WTO law against Respondents by either curtailing their
reserved rights or creating new obligations under the covered
agreements or even beyond WTO law.
To reach these conclusions, this study went beyond an analysis
of the relative success rates of Complainants and Respondents and
attempted to identify patterns in the type of law created. Rather
than focusing solely on who won each dispute, it considered whether
precedent-creating decisions favored a particular type of litigant.
Such decisions more often than not seemed to rest on particular
teleological interpretations assumed by adjudicators and not on the
quality of the litigants’ arguments. Because these interpretations
neatly fell on one side of the Complainant–Respondent divide, the
study was able to establish a link between adjudicatory lawmaking
and the empirically and anecdotally established asymmetrical
pattern of outcomes. By calling attention to this extreme pattern of
decisions, this Article seeks to further the discussion of democratic
legitimacy and legality, so that academics, WTO adjudicators,
politicians, and trade constituencies might more fully understand the
implications and consequences of the system they have created and
continue to perpetuate.

